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AUTOMATIC EXTINCTION OF CROSS-DEMANDS:
COMPENSATIO FROM ROME TO CALIFORNIA
A client tells the following story: his auto was struck from the rear
by a department store delivery truck, and he incurred minor injuries.
The circumstances indicate that the truck driver was negligent and that
the department store will be liable. Having established this, the at-
torney's next inquiry should be: has the client a charge account with
the store? For if so, he may withhold payments on his charge account
to recompense him for his injuries and the damage to his car; his charge
account bill is paid to that extent. This result is dictated by Section
440 of the California Code of Civil Procedure:
When cross-demands have existed between persons under such cir-
cumstances that, if one had brought an action against the other, a
counterclaim could have been set up, the two demands shall be deemed
compensated, so far as they equal each other, and neither can be
deprived of the benefit thereof by the assignment or death of the other.1
One possible meaning of the statute, and that which California courts
have given it, is that cross-demands are automatically extinguished:
they need only coexist at a moment in time at which the counterclaim
requirement of Code of Civil Procedure Section 438 is satisfied. When
these conditions are met, section 440 operates, and -the respective de-
mands are "compensated-paid, discharged, acquitted-to the amount
of the lesser demand. This legal extinction of the claims takes place
automatically, without the knowledge or agreement of the debtors.'
A striking recent example is King Brothers Productions, Inc. v. RKO
Teleradio Pictures, Inc.a King sued for breach of RKO's agreement to
distribute King's motion pictures. RKO counterclaimed, alleging that
the script for one of the pictures was the property of RKO and that
King had "converted said script to its own use; the value of said script
was in excess of Two hundred and fifty thousand dollars."14 The counter-
claim was more than two years old; under Code of Civil Procedure sec-
tion 339 it would ordinarily be barred. But on King's motion for partial
1 CAL. CoDE Civ. PRoc. § 440. The section was originally § 48 of the Civil Practice
Act of 1851, Cal. Stats. ch. 5 (1851).
2 E.g., King Bros. Prods., Inc. v. RKO Teleradio Pictures, Inc., 208 F. Supp. 271
(S.D.N.Y. 1962); Hauger v. Gates, 42 Cal. 2d 752, 269 P.2d 609 (1954); Jones v. Mortimer,
28 Cal. 2d 627, 170 P.2d 893 (1946); Pan Pacific Sash & Door Co. v. Greendale Park, Inc.,
166 Cal. App. 2d 652, 333 P.2d 802 (1958); Sunrise Produce Co. v. Malovich, 101 Cal.
App. 2d 520, 225 P.2d 973 (1950).
3 208 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
4 Id. at 273.
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summary judgment, the court held the claim admissible under California's
construction of section 440.5 The two demands-that of King and that
of RKO-subsisted together only for that instant of time-unknown to
the parties and the court alike, when first they coexisted. In that incre-
ment of time, the demands were "compensated" to the amount they were
equal, leaving no outstanding claim on which the statute of limitation
could run. This compensation took place though both demands were un-
liquidated; neither the court nor the parties knew, when King's motion
for partial summary judgment was denied, the extent to which the de-
mands were paid. That could be known only later, after the court ruled
on the validity and amount of the respective claims.
Automatic compensation as exemplified by King Brothers, an auto-
matic extrajudicial extinction of cross-demands, may be contrasted with
three other means of dealing with reciprocal claims. First, the German
Civil Code' provides that if two parties are mutual debtors of liquidated
sums, either party may address a declaration to the other that the claims
are compensated: this is termed facultative or volitional compensation.1
Second, in American law, mutual debts may be extinguished extra-
judicially by the accord of both debtors.' Finally, there are judicially-
administered means of extinguishing mutual claims presented by the
respective parties: common law examples include setoff, recoupment and
counterclaim.'
5 Id. at 278.
6 BiYRGERmCHES GEsETzBucH § 388.
7 6 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAITT PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRA-AIS §§ 1292-95 (Esmein,
Radouant, Gabolde ed. 1954). For Planiol, facultative compensation is like common law
accord and satisfaction, see note 8 infra, except that one party may invoke it. At French
law, it does not operate retroactively.
s The orthodox rule with respect to cross-demands is stated by Corbin: "The substituted
performance accepted in satisfaction of a claim may itself be the discharge of some counter-
claim; and nothing more is necessary to effectuate such mutual discharges than the agree-
ment that they shall be so discharged. Such a transaction is not an accord executory; it is
accord and satisfaction." 6 CORBn, CONTRACTS § 1286, at 157-58 (1962). The claims thus
comprised can be unliquidated. Id. at 158. Accord, REsTATErENT, CONTRACTS § 422 (1932).
But if A and B are mutually indebted, and A renders an account of their dealings, un-
reasonably long silence by B is acceptance of the account. Ibid.
9The definition and history of setoff are extensively treated in the text accompanying
notes 163-76 infra. "Recoupment is contradistinguished from setoff in these three essential
particulars: 1st. In being confined to matters arising out of, and connected with, the
transaction or contract upon which the suit is brought; 2d. In having no regard whether
or not such matter be liquidated or unliquidated; and 3d. That the judgment is not the
subject of statutory regulation, but controlled by the rules of the common law." WATEEmAx,
SET-Ozr, RECoupi ANTD COUNrERCLAIM § 480 (2d ed. 1872).
Counterclaim, both the word itself and the first definition, is an invention of David
Dudley Field. See text accompanying notes 194-200 infra. The current Code of Civil Pro-
cedure § 438, defining a counterclaim, differs markedly from the Field version, as a con-
sequence of a 1927 amendment. Cal. Stats. ch. 813 (1927). See CrLnx, CODE PEADING
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How did California law come to provide for automatic compensation
in addition to counterclaim and cross-complaint?- The rule of section 440
may be traced to Roman law, where the cancellation of cross-demands
was known as compensatio. Twenty centuries later, section 440's pro-
genitor was drafted by David Dudley Field, who was probably following
a recommendation of Justice Story; Story had looked to Roman, French
and English law.
This Comment returns to those sources. Part I discusses compensatio
in the context of Roman civil procedure. Compensatio began as a judicial
offset available in a narrow group of actions and concluded its Roman
career as a broad counterclaim provision with some features of automatic
compensation. Part II discusses the French law of compensatio. The
north of France initially rejected it; the south readily borrowed it from
the Romans. In borrowing, however, the "written law" of southern France
interpreted Roman compensatio as providing for automatic extinction of
cross-demands. While this interpretation was rejected by the Christian
courts in France, it prevailed in the Code Napoleon; the Code and its
authors had great influence upon David Dudley Field.
Part III discusses the influence of Mansfield and Story upon the law
of setoff. Mansfield, learned in the Roman law, made the influential state-
ment: "Natural equity says, that cross-demands should be compen-
sated."'" Story, borrowing from the Romans and French, and from
Mansfield, approved of the automatic extinction of cross-demands.
Part IV traces the legislative history of the current section 440,
through David Field's Proposed Code of Civil Procedure, the California
Civil Practice Act of 1851, and the Code of Civil Procedure of 1872.
Part V traces the California decisional law; no California case construing
section 440 has mentioned its civil law antecedents, and interpretations of
section 440 have been diverse and, at times, quixotic. Part VI attempts
to state a coherent view of section 440, looking to its history and its
potential effect upon the substantive and adjective law of cross-demands.
I
THE ROMAN ORIGINS
1 1
Compensatio was devised as one means to abate the rigor which
characterized pre-classic Roman procedural law. Paralleling reform in the
§§ 100-01 (2d ed. 1947); Comment, 1 U.C.LA. L. Rr v. 547, 564 (1954); Note, 31 CALw.
L. REV. 210 (1943).
10 Green v. Farmer, 4 Burr. 2214, 2220, 98 Eng. Rep. 154, 157 (K.B. 1768).
" This section draws heavily on background material in CARY, A HISTORY OF RowE
(2d ed. 1954); BoAx, A HISTORY OF ROaA TO 565 Afl. (4th ed. 1955); TOUTAIN, Tn
ECONO~iC LmE OF T=E A wcI, WORLD (1951); the early chapters of Somi, Tm IN-
sTruTEs: A TExmoox OF =En HISTORY Am Sys=ma OF Rolf= PMVATE LAW (Ledlie
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means of creating obligations,12 Roman civil procedure strove in the
fourth through the second centuries B.C. to discard the rituals involved
in the enforcement of obligations and to adapt to the exigencies of an
expanding commercial life. An early step toward reform was the creation
of a new magistracy, the praetor, in 367 B.C. The praetor was invested
with the power to publish, in a yearly edict, new causes of action which
would be recognized in his court."8 This reform in judicial administra-
tion left two major problems unresolved.
First, the forms of action-legis actiones---did not admit of counter-
claim. The plaintiff stated his claim, the defendant responded according
to the prescribed ritual, and the magistrate referred the case to a delegate-
judge-a iudex-for decision. The referral, a grant of jurisdiction to
hear and decide, directed that the iudex either find for the plaintiff or
completely absolve the defendant. 4 The procedure was in this sense
reminiscent of the common law's fetish for reducing the lawsuit to one
issue and turning the decision upon that issue. 5
The other principal obstacle to orderly adjudication was the exclusion
of aliens from the courts. A non-Roman was rightless, denied judicial
enforcement of his contracts; this in a city with pretensions to become the
commercial and political center of the Mediterranean. This condition
was ameliorated piecemeal by a series of treaties granting Roman corn-
transl. of 3d ed. 1907) [hereinafter cited as Sonr] ; RoLL, A HISTORY" OF ECONOinC ThOUGHT
35-40 (3d ed. 1954).
12 One example of this rigor will suffice: mancipatio, the early ritual required to make
a valid transfer of property. "[In the presence of not less than five Roman citizens of
full age and also a sixth person, having the same qualifications, known as the libripens, to
hold a bronze scale, the party who is taking by the mancipation, holding a bronze ingot,
says: 'I declare this slave is mine by Quiritary right, and he be purchased to me with this
bronze ingot and bronze scale.' He then strikes the scale with the ingot and gives it as a
symbolic price to him from whom he is receiving by the mancipation. .. .The bronze
ingot and scale are used because formerly only bronze money was in use; there were asses,
double-asses, half- and quarter-asses, but neither gold nor silver money was current, as
we may gather from the law of the Twelve Tables. The value of these pieces was reckoned
not by counting but by weighing." GAIus 1.119, .122 (de Zulueta transl. 1946). See BucK-
wmA, A MANUAL OF RowAN PrrATE LAw § 45 (2d ed. 1939) [hereinafter cited as MANUAL].
With respect to Gaius, who wrote in the second century AD., see, e.g., Sona § 18, at 98;
RADiu, RomAx LAW § 31, at 81 (1927) [hereinafter cited as RADTI].
13 RADn; §§ 8, 14.
14 GA"US 4.11-30 contains a discussion of the legis actio procedure, albeit in retrospect:
the method had largely been abrogated by his day. See RADIN § 11. The five legis actiones
included a general one, one for attachment of the defendant's body, for attachment of his
property, for appointment of an arbitrator, and for the framing of a special issue. They
were of broader scope than the common law writs; the rigor consisted in the faithfulness
with which the ritual was executed and the single-minded pursuit of the utter condemnation
or absolution of the defendant. "Condemn," in this connection, means to render a civil
judgment sustaining the plaintiff's claim against the defendant.
15 See note 288 infra and accompanying text.
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mercial law rights to aliens. A more comprehensive solution was achieved
in 243 B.C. with the appointment of the praetor peregrinus to hear cases
in which aliens were parties. The former praetor took the title praetor
urbanus.16 This reform betokened great changes in the whole of Roman
substantive and adjective law. The urban praetor administered the Roman
customary and statute law-the ius civile'--much as before the appoint-
ment of the peregrine praetor. The peregrine praetor looked for guidance
to the ius gentium,'8 that body of rules common to the commercial practice
of the polyglot community of bankers, traders, and businessmen who
carried on Rome's foreign commerce. The existence of this dual legal
system, rather like the later coexistence of law and equity, 9 led to subtle
and pervasive changes in the ius civile. The ius civile, overtly and other-
wise, borrowed from the ius gentium.
The peregrine praetor administered not only a more flexible substan-
tive law; procedure before him was more informal as well. The plaintiff
discussed his claim. The praetor, if he thought the allegations stated a
claim within the ius gentium, set out written instructions on the disposition
of the controversy-a "formula"20 and sent the matter to the delegate-
judges who served his court.2 ' The formula also comprehended the de-
16 Soim § 13, at 65-66.
'7 "That law which a people establishes for itself is peculiar to it, and is called ius
civile as being the special law of the civitas ... " GAIus 1.1. See RADiN § 16; SomE= § 11, at 48.
18 "[The law that natural reason establishes among all mankind is followed by all
peoples alike, and is called ius gentium as being the law observed by all mankind." Garus 1.1.
Law before the peregrine praetor was based on aequum et bonum--equity and justice-
and upon customs of the known world. The available civil law rituals all contained the
phrase "ex iure Quiritium"-deriving from my right as a member of a Roman clan-and
were if only for that reason unsuitable. RADIN § 17.
19 MA=l, AciECNr LAw ch. 3 (1st ed. 1861).2 0 The formula has no precise equivalent in American or English law; it was a grant
of jurisdiction and statement of the case by the praetor, for the guidance of the hudex.
It began with the appointment of the iudex. Then proceeded a statement of the case (the
demonstratio), a statement of the issue (the intentio), then an instruction to condemn or
acquit the defendant (condemnatio), or an instruction to adjust the conflicting claims of
the parties (adiudicatio). Between the condemnatio or adiudicatlo and the intentio might
come pleas in avoidance or denial: the exceptio, replicatio, duplicatio, and so forth. Gaius
has given us several examples of the formula, of which the following is one (Aulus Augerius,
AA.-the plaintiff-is Rome's John Doe; Numerius Negidius, N.V.-the defendant-is
Richard Roe): X is appointed iudex. Demonstratio: Whereas Aulus Augerius sold the slave
to Numerius Negidius. Intentio: if it appears that N.N. ought to pay A.. 10,000 sesterces.
Condemnatio: do thou, iudex, condemn N.N. to pay A4. in 10,000 sesterces. If it does not
appear, absolve. GsAis 4.39-.52.
The formula operated something like the common law writ plus the pleas which fol-
lowed, but it had the advantage of being a formal reduction of a conversation between
plaintiff and defendant about their dispute, in which all pleas were put in at once, rather
than over months of procedural delay.
The formula was later replaced by the more complex cognition procedure. RADIm § 32.
211RDm § 17.
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fendant's pleas in bar of the plaintiff's allegations. Certainly before the
delegate-judge, and perhaps in the formula as well, the defendant was
also allowed to plead a sort of counterclaim: compensatio. When the
formula was adopted in the urban praetor's court in 150 B.C., this pro-
cedure was probably adopted as well.2
The source of compensatio is not known: Aristotle debates the merits
of setoff in the Politics, but makes clear that no such procedure was used
in the Athenian courts of his day 23 At its Roman inception, compensatio
was available only when contracts of a certain type were sued upon. At
an early date, Roman contract law had bifurcated into contracts stricti
iuris and those bonae fidei, roughly corresponding to the division be-
tween unilateral and bilateral contracts. 24 The most important contract
bonae fidei was that of sale-emptio venditio 5 The remedy for breach of
this bilateral contract was by iudicium bonae fidei, a "good faith action."
The distinctive feature of all such actions was that judgment was given
for that amount which just men would say the defendant ought to pay 6
The defendant might raise objection before the iudex that he should not
be required to pay the full price because, for example, the goods were
shoddy. Other objections arising from the same bilateral transaction as
that sued upon might also be raised before the iudex; it was not neces-
sary that they be pleaded before the praetor or compassed in the formula:
This offset, demanded by the defendant as a matter of good faith, marked
the extent of compensatio at its origins.
Gaius' Institutes, written about 150 A.D., contain the earliest sur-
viving discussion of compensatio :27
61. In bonae fidei actions the iudex appears to be allowed complete dis-
cretion in assessing, on the basis of justice and equity, how much ought
to be made good (restitui) to the plaintiff, and this involves that he
may take into account any counter-obligation due from the plaintiff
22 This change was wrought by the Aebutian law. RADai § 18; GAius 4.30.
2 3 Aristotle says that "a qualified verdict [i.e., one taking account of and adjudicating
a counterclaim] is possible in a court of arbitration, even where there are several arbitrators
(for they can confer with one another in order to determine their verdict); but in a court
of law such a verdict is impossible, since . . . the majority of legal codes contain specific
measures that the judges shall not communicate." 2 AroTLE, Pourncs ch. 8, § 13 (Barker
transl. 1946). Compare 4 BEAUCHET, HISTOME DU DOIT PRsIV DR L.A REPUBQuE ATENmNE
513-14 (1897).
2 4 BucxLqi & McNAi, Rom=b LAw AND COmmoN LAW 271-76 (2d ed. 1952) draws
the distinction and discusses the role of the unilateral binding promise in Roman law. See
also Bucx.AND, A Tanr-Boozx or RomAN LAW § 153, at 437 (2d ed. 1932) [hereinafter
cited as TExT-BooK].
25M M.AL §§ 107-08.
20P, ADN § 64, at 192-93.
27A portion of the text is missing, and the quoted section begins in the middle of
Gaius' treatment of compensatio.
1965]
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
under the same transaction and may condemn the defendant only in
the difference.
62. The bonae fidei actions are those on sale, hiring, unauthorized
agency, mandate, deposit, fiducia, partnership, tutorship, and wife's
dowry.
63. It is nevertheless open to the iudex (in such actions) to take no
account of any counter-obligation; for this is not enjoined expressly
by the formula, but is considered to lie within his office as being con-
sonant with a bonae fidei action2
Gaius goes on to discuss invocation of compensatio against a banker;
while regulated by different principles, the use of compensatio in that
context may have presaged its expansion in later law. Bankers kept the
accounts of Rome, and their records were of the greatest importance. If
a banker sued, he was required to take account in his claim of all things
of the same kind (and perhaps quality) which he owed the defendant.
Should he fail to balance his books in the allegation and claim the slightest
bit over, he was out of court." This was a special instance of the general
rule that to be plus petitio-to have over-alleged-lost the action. 0
As Rome's financial life increased in complexity, the legal and
political order changed correspondingly." As Rome expanded by conquest
and trade, available capital to support public works, private investment,
and the immense military was expanded by means of paper stock certi-
ficates, bills of exchange, and related devices.8 Like the Roman legal
system as a whole, compensatio was shaped to meet new needs.
Emperor Antonius Pius (138-161 A.D.) held that a private defendant
could compensate claims against a governmental plaintiff, provided "the
same department which is indebted is the plaintiff."8 This ruling has
added significance when one considers the extensive financial dealings
between the Roman state and the Roman men of wealth.
8 4
It was Emperor Marcus Aurelius (161-180 A.D.), however, who
28 GArus 4.61-.63.
29 GArus 4.64-.68.
80 GA -s 4.53. The defendant might raise a claim of, for example, fraud, before the
praetor, which was given effect by inserting an exceptio into the formula. If the exceptio
were proven, that meant the plaintiff had over-alleged; the transaction sued upon was
voided and he lost altogether. There was thus an impetus for the plaintiff to "compensate"
on his own before bringing the lawsuit, and to ask that the condemnatio be framed to give
him the difference between his claim and that of the defendant. So m § 89, at 442.
Ma-uAl § 168, at 404-05.81 WFn, FRom MAx WEBER: EssAys ix SOcaOLoGY 166-67 (Gerth and Mills eds.
1946); Roll, op. cit. supra note 11, at 36; Toutain, op. cit. supra note 11, at 230-31,
246-59.8 2 TouTAi, op. cit. supra note 11, at 248; CARY, op. cit. supra note 11, at 262.
33 CoDE 4.31.1.
8 4 WEBER, op. cit. supra note 31, at 167.
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ordained the first important extension of compensatio: he ruled that
compensatio was available in iudiciis stricti iuris-the form of action to
enforce unilateral contracts-provided the defendant pleaded his claim
by inserting an exceptio doli in the formula3 5 This reform was doubly
significant. First, since most of the contracts enforceable by an action
stricti iuris were unilateral, Marcus's rescript apparently allowed compen-
satio when the claims arose from different transactions.3 Second, Marcus's
order expanded the function of the exceptio in Roman pleading. Thereto-
fore, an exceptio doli was pleaded by the defendant in bar of the plaintiff's
claim; were it proven, judgment was given for the defendant "by way of
exception." But an exceptio doli pleading compensatio was inserted to
determine, not whether the defendant should pay the plaintiff, but how
much he should pay.3
Given these reforms, how did compensatio operate? In other words,
when the defendant pleaded compensatio, did the Romans regard the plea
as submission of a countervailing claim for judicial disposition? Or was
a plea of compensatio regarded as the allegation of the fact of counter-
vailing obligations which had, automatically at -the moment they first co-
existed, mutually extinguished one another? In the former case, compen-
satio could only operate prospectively from the time of judgment; in the
latter case, a judicial declaration that compensatio had taken place would
be recognition of an existing state of affairs.
Scholars of Roman law disagree as to which view of compensatio
prevailed in Rome. Sohm says that Roman law opted for a form of auto-
matic compensatio "and expressed the view it adopted in the rule: ipso
iure compensari."381 But he observes that the compensatio was provisional
only, subject to be negated by, for example, advancement of a different
claim at the time of suit, or by payment of one of the claims.
Buckland says that the defendant did not have to raise compensating
claims in the plaintiff's action, but could wait until later without having
res judicata pleaded against him.39 Upon this, in part, he rests his view
that ipso iure compensari did not mean automatic compensation.
40
3 5 Marcus' declaration does not survive, but Justinian cites it at INSnrums 4.6.30
(Addy & Walker transl.). For a discussion of Justinian's codification, see RADn § 34;
MANUAL § 8, at 22-24. The function of an exceptio is discussed in text accompanying note
37 infra. "Doli" is a variation of "dolus," meaning any of a gamut of things ranging from
guile to acts or omissions which do harm irrespective of the good or bad intent of the doer.
See BLrAC, LAW DiCTIONARY 570 (4th ed. 1951).
36 See material cited at note 24 supra.
37 Sons § 89, at 443.
38 Id. at 445. See generally UBEEKOLDE, IPSO 1uRE COMPENSATU (1858), which dis-
cusses the Roman texts in detail.
39 T=r-Boox § 238, at 705.4o Ipso iure may be variously translated as meaning that compensatio takes places auto-
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Appleton, a French historian writing at the close of the nineteenth
century,4 questions the innovating character of Marcus's rescript. He
takes the view that the Roman provisions for stay of execution on the
plaintiff's judgment, pending decision of a contemporaneous action
brought by the defendant, would be meaningless if the defendant could
raise all his claims in the plaintiff's lawsuit. Appleton's view is that
Marcus limited the types of claims that could be compensated in the
same action. If the defendant's claim was other than incontestable and
in the same coin as the plaintiff's, he had first to reduce it to judgment;
the judge in the original action would then declare the compensation and
the plaintiff could execute on the difference. 2
Of course, Sohm, Buckland, and Appleton could only speculate, for
evidence of compensatio in the period after Marcus is limited almost
entirely to that handed on by Justinian's compilers. In the codification
of Justinian, later termed the Corpus Iuris Civilis, compensatio is treated
in the Institutes, the Code, and the Digest.8
Sohm's view that compensation was automatic finds some support in
a rescript of Emperor Alexander (221-235 A.D.) set forth in the Code;
Alexander held that when two persons are mutually indebted to the same
amount, compensatio operates ipso iure, and "takes the place of pay-
ment." In such a situation, interest is allowed only on "the surplus of the
debt, which could not be extinguished by compensatio. 44
The Digest is more explicit, and cites Ulpian:46 "When one person
owes another a debt without interest, and this other owes the first a debt
with interest, following an order of Emperor Severus, interest is not due
on the respective amounts. ' 4 This seems to say that compensatio operated
automatically to extinguish the claims, at the moment they coexisted and
to the amount of the lesser debt. But Appleton questions this construction
of Ulpian's words Ulpian may have been talking only of certain types
of debts. For example, a trustee is late in performance and therefore owes
matically, or that it takes place as of right when pleaded, or that it need not be pleaded
in order to take advantage of it at trial.
4 1 HISonx D. LA COMPENSATION EN DRorr R oMAIN (1895) [hereinafter cited as APPLE-
TON]. Appleton was professor of law at Lyons.
4 2 See Id. ch. 5.
43 The Code collected decrees of the Roman emperors; the Digest was composed of
excerpts from the work of Roman jurists; the Institutes was a treatise on Roman law,
designed primarily for students. After the codification, later decrees were collected in the
Novels. See RADmN § 34; MANUAL § 8, at 22-24.
4 4 CoDE 4.31.4. But see APPLETON 470.
4 5 Ulpian, who served in important posts under Alexander Severus (222-35 A.D.),
wrote at great length and with attention to system and detail. A third of the Digest is
taken from his work. PAxD § 31, at 82.
46 DIGEST 6.2.11.
47 APPLETON 290 n.1.
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interest:4" if it eventuated at the lawsuit that the cestui owed the trustee
some money on another, interest-free, transaction, it would hardly be
fair to charge the penalty-payment against the trustee. Appleton pro-
pounds other hypotheticals in arguing that it is just as logical, and more
consistent with known Roman procedure, to think that the adjustment
of interest reflected not an unseen hand adding figures in the ledger in
the sky, but the iudex meting out practical justice. 9
Another Digest fragment says that obligations which could not be the
basis of a lawsuit in the first instance might be set up by way of compen-
satio when defending a suit.50 These "natural obligations" were consensual
agreements barred by a specific incapacity or defense, such as minority,
on the part of one or both of the parties. 1 The nature of natural obliga-
tions was essentially equitable, and enforcement ordinarily left to a sense
of honor. But, if one party performed, though he had no legal obligation
to do so, he could not sue and get back what he had given.52
As unexecuted natural obligation could, if Ulpian is correctly quoted
in the Digest, "be set up by way of compensatio."53 One reading of these
words is that when the plaintiff sought to change the status quo by suing
on a contract which fulfilled the technical requisites for validity, the de-
fendant could ask that money due him under a contract invalid for
technical reasons be put into compensation against the plaintiff's demand:
he who claims justice must do justice. Buckland, however, is of the view
that the pacts of a slave were the only natural obligations which could
be set up in compensatio.54 Appleton quotes Ulpian's comment and notes
that most of the surviving fragments of this section of Ulpian's work
deal with partnership.55 He concludes that "it is with respect to a
genuinely bilateral contract, that of partnership," that Ulpian made the
quoted observation.58 "The compliers . . ." says Appleton, "in isolating
the fragment from its context, gave it a general significance which it did
not have; the possibility of setting off in compensation natural obligations
has to be restricted to claims arising from the same transaction. 1 7
48 GArus 2.280.
4 9 HART & SACKS, TnE LFsGAL PRocEss 132-34 (tentative ed. 1958), distinguishing "self-
applying" from "individually-administered" regulations, suggests the difference.
5 0 DiGosT 16.2.6.
51 RAmN § 112a; So m § 84, at 414; MAxuAL § 133.
52The closest analogy at common law is to an executed gift: if A promises to make
a gift to B in 5 days, there is no enforceable contract. But if A delivers the gift, a court
will not let him get it back. See, e.g., Gray v. Barton, 55 N.Y. 68 (1873).
53 
DIGST 16.2.6.
5 4 IAuAL § 133, at 337.
55 APPLETON 66-68.
56 Id. at 67.
57 Ibid. Appleton discusses a case involving a slave's bilateral contract, and concludes
compensatlo was not involved. Id. at 67 n3.
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Whatever the status of compensatio after Marcus, it is certain that
Justinian introduced changes. Appleton believes the changes were designed
to rectify injustices resulting from a defendant's ability to upset the action
at any stage with a fraudulent counterclaim; 8 the more usual view is that
Justinian broadened compensatio.5 Justinian himself says that "a consti-
tution of ours has more widely introduced those setoffs [compensationes]
which rest upon manifest justice. ' 60 The constitution to which Justinian
refers is set out in the Code:
We order that compensatio takes place as of right [ipso iure] in all
actions, real or personal.
§.1. We allow cornpensatio when the credit offered in payment
is liquid [liquida], does not raise difficulties, and is susceptible of being
easily adjudicated; for it is unjust that when a case has been proven
after much discussion, the other party, who is almost convicted, can
plead compensatio against an ascertained and unmistakable debt, and
defeat expectations by protracting the proceeding. Hence, we recom-
mend that judges not lightly or with indifference admit compensatio,
but proceed strictly; and should it appear that the proposed com-
pensatio would require great and lengthy inquiry, we order that such
a claim be saved for another action, and the former inquiry, almost
entirely concluded, go to judgment. We except from the actions in
which compensatio is available, the action of deposit .... I,
§.2. Neither may an adverse possessor set up compensatio.62
The Roman treatment of compensatio, from its beginnings in the form-
ulary procedure to Justinian's Corpus Iuris, influenced common law treat-
ment of cross-demands in two major ways. First, the direct influence of
the Corpus Iuris upon common law scholars such as Story and Mansfield
is acknowledged.6" Second, Roman law principles were adopted and
adapted in Continental Europe by secular and ecclesiastical tribunals;
this Continental law-principally, in the case of compensatio, that of
France-was itself influential in the work of common law judges and
scholars. The work of Story and Mansfield is considered in part III of
this Comment; part II discusses the assimilation of Roman compensatio
into the legal system of France.
581d. at 409-11.
59 E.g., Soam § 89, at 445-46.
60 .Nsr 4.6.30.
61 INsTrruTEs 4.6.30 notes that it would be unfair to allow a setoff when the plaintiff
seeks restitution of a specific chattel. Further, the fiduciary nature of the deposit agree-
ment precluded other than faithful performance of the agreement notwithstanding cross-
demands.
62 CoDE 4.31.14.
63 See notes 160, 177-88 infra and accompanying text.
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II
compensatio IN FRENCH LAw
Though the Roman origins of compensatio were recognized by eight-
eenth and nineteenth century legal scholars, most of them looked first to
the French interpretations of the doctrine for guidance. The French
students of Roman law had unfortunately achieved an imperfect view of
Roman compensatio, arising in part from incomplete information, and in
part from their respective political biases. Compensatio, and related forms
of setoff and counterclaim, created heated political controversy in
medieval France, and the ultimate French view of compensatio in the
Code Napoleon is a synthesis reflecting conflicting demands for national
unity and local feudal privilege.
After the thirteenth century, France was split into two fairly distinct
areas. In the northern two-thirds of the country, the customary law 4
governed: each feudal fiefdom had its peculiar admixture of rules
descended from the barbarian invaders, more or less modified by Roman
and canon influences. To the south, the medieval period saw the flourish-
ing of "written law" based upon Justinian, whose work had become the
focus of scholarly study.65 The canon law comprised a third legal system,
uniform throughout France. Based in its secular aspects upon Roman
law, canon law influenced the secular courts, and was applied directly
to cases within the jurisdiction of the Christian courts. 6 The view of
compensatio differed in each of these three legal systems.
A. The Customary Law
Those who overturned Rome's control of Gaul established the "per-
sonality of laws": one called to court was held by the law of his own
people. In the barbarian kingdoms of Gaul-Burgundian, Visigoth, and
Frankish-jural relations between Roman and Roman were governed by
Roman law; those between a Roman and one of the dominant tribe were
probably governed by barbarian law. In time, however, this system faced
two difficulties. First, intermarriage made inquiries about origins some-
what artificial. Second, "judges had to be capable of knowing and under-
standing the texts of the various Laws and royal amendments; instead,
ignorance and barbarity increased constantly . . . and a well-read man
04 "Customary" denotes that the legal rules were based upon usage and tradition,
rather than on statute.
6 5 EsmEr, CoUsS ELEMENTAIRE D'HISTOIRE DU DROIT RANgAIS 786-87 (11th ed. 1912)
[hereinafter cited as Esm=].
66 Esmrn 862-64.
U7Esurx 57-64, 782-83; 1 LAnT, DROIT 3UMMATIONAL Priv 60-66 (1888).
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became a rarity." 8 As a result, the concept of "personality of law" came
to be repudiated, and in each region there was formed a customary law
uniformly applicable to all those domiciled there. Naturally, in each area
the laws of the dominant race furnished the principal constituents of the
customary law.6 9 Each feudal fiefdom came to have its own set of laws.
Canon and Roman law exerted great influence upon the customary
law; acceptance of canon and Roman principles by customary law courts
had far advanced by the time of Louis XIV.70 Illustrative is the initial
rejection and later acceptance of judicial offset and automatic compensa-
tion. An early reliable record 71 is a treatise on the customary law of
Beauvaisis, completed in 1283 by Philippe de Beaumanoir. 72 Beaumanoir
notes that counterclaims were allowed by the courts Christian. In the
seigneurial, or lay, courts a defendant could only defend, and could not
raise a cross-demand. 7 The defendant was not limited, however, to either
confessing or denying that he had indeed incurred the obligation. He could
plead "payment," a term embracing defenses which a modern court
would denominate counterclaim. Beaumanoir propounds a case in which
a cleric is suing for twenty pounds due him from a layman. The layman
says that with the intention of discharging the debt, he lent some money
to the cleric. The cleric replies that the court should make the defendant
pay up; if he wants the money he lent, he should make a claim to the
cleric's monastic seigneur. But he cannot thus escape.
We before whom these pleas are contested say to the cleric that if he
does not respond to the layman's plea that he has lent the cleric some-
thing after the debt of twenty pounds was incurred, we will not con-
strain the layman to pay the twenty pounds, for he was not making
a counterclaim when he said that he had lent the money with the
intention of discharging the debt; but if he demands of the cleric
something due at a time before the debt was made, or he demands
6 8 Esm= 782.
69.d at 782-83.
7 0 The canon law treatment of cross-demands is discussed in text accompanying notes
119-31 infra.
71 The reliability of Beaumanoir is attested by, inter alia, EsMMN 800-01.
7 2 BEAumAwom, CourTumms DE BEAuvAsIs (Salmon ed. 1899).
7SId. § 357: "There is a custom in the Christian court which is not observed in the
secular court: for if Peter demands ten pounds that John has contracted to pay him, John
can demand of Peter that he return a horse which he has provided to him. ... And this
custom is called counterclaim by the Christian court. And if the said Peter who has sued the
said John does not want to respond to the claim for the horse because he was not sum-
moned to respond to John as John was summoned to respond to him, then John need not
reply to the claim for the ten pounds. But it is otherwise in the secular court, for he who is
summoned must defend, and the defendant cannot make a demand without a separate
summons for any claim other than that to which he was called to answer. . . . Thus one
can see that counterclaims do not arise in the secular court as they do in the Christian
court."
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of him horses, or other beasts, or grain, or wine, or other things having
no connection with the twenty pounds, we will oblige him to pay the
twenty pounds and make his claim before the cleric's ordinary.7 4
Beaumanoir's discussion does not even consider automatic extinction
of cross-demands; he is concerned only with the scope of judicial offset;
the claims which a judge will cognize in adjusting cross-demands as of the
time of -the suit. It is reconventio-counterclaim-not compensatio.
Somewhat later, other customary law jurisdictions considered both
concepts, and rejected both. When the customary law of Lorris and
Montargis was put in writing in 1531, it was flatly stated:
IX. Counterclaim takes place not at all in the secular court.
X. Compensation [of cross-demands] takes place not at all in the
secular court.75
Loisel, summarizing the customary law in 1608,7" was equally explicit:
§.704. One debt prevents not at all the existence of another.... In
a word, this means that where there are mutual and reciprocal debts,
each of the parties must tender payment of that which is due, neither
being able to counterclaim or compensate. 77
Hence, compensation and counterclaim were known to the customary
law. A major obstacle to their acceptance, however, seems to have been
jurisdictional covetousness. This state of affairs rested upon two con-
siderations. First, seigneurs refused to tolerate usurpation of their local
jurisdiction by outsiders. If Peter went before John's lord to present a
claim against John, Peter and his lord were not disposed to submit to the
indignity of John's lord adjudicating a claim against Peter. Second, not
until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries did Roman law experience
the rebirth of influence that promoted acceptance of compensatio and
counterclaim by the customary law."8
The view that feudal jealousy and insularity were chiefly responsible
74 Id. § 359.
7 5 Les couturnes anciennes de Lorris, des bailliage et prevost6 de Montargis ch. 21,
arts. 9-10 (1531), in 3 NouvEAu COUuiER GaNmuL 829 (1724) [the collection is here-
inafter cited as N.C.G.]. The citations to N.C.G. in this Comment are in the follow-
ing form: first the title of the code of customary law, followed by the place in that code
referred to in the text, followed by the date, if available of the codification. The citation
to N.C.G. follows, with volume number and the number of the page in that volume on
which the reprint of the particular code begins.
76 LoisEL, Ixsrnuras couTumAREs (Dupin & Laboulaye ed. 1846). The original pub-
lication date was 1608. Esmsxtx 814.
77 LoissL, op. cit. supra note 76, at § 704.
78 On the influence of Roman law, see generally Esa 782-846; 1 SHERmAN, Rom=
LAW nx- THE MODERN WORLD § 241 (3d ed. 1937); VxoOoRADOF, RomAN LAW i MnrDEvA
EiRoP 65-83 (1909). Assimilation of the Roman principles of compensatio is discussed in
text accompanying notes 83-18 infra.
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for the customary law's refusal to cognize counterclaims is suggested by
representative, though far from complete, evidence drawn principally
from the officially-sanctioned expositions of customary law.7' The
monarchy encouraged reducing the customary law to writing in this
manner as an attempt to introduce consistency and clarity in the law. 0
A writer upon the custom of Meaux in 1683 cited two reasons for not
allowing judicial offset in the secular court. First, the plaintiff was
ordinarily required to sue the defendant in the latter's jurisdiction. Second,
.the maintenance of the system of feudal justice, with obligations and
rights inherited by lord and vassal alike, required that adjudications of
property rights originating in Meaux not be subject to divestment in,
for example, Lorris.81 The Coutume of the Marche in 1521 incorporated
this concept into its definition of judicial offset: "Counterclaim takes
place not at all, unless the parties be domiciliaries of the same forum,
in which case it takes place without a new action."8"
In the late sixteenth century, the provincial view evidenced by these
rules began to give way. Roman law was an influence; when it came time
to reduce the custom to writing, some gaps might be filled by reference
.to Justinian. 3 Perhaps, too, experience had shown that counterclaim
could be tolerated; when admitted by special dispensation,8 4 the anti-
7 9 The Nouv Au COUTuMIER GENERAL (1724) is an authoritative collection, repro-
ducing with notes by jurists the local collections of customary law; cited herein as
N.C.G., it is the collection in which the original research for this Comment was done. On
the reduction to writing of the customary law, see Esumum 815-32; SHERMAN, op. cit.
supra note 78, at § 240.
80EsmE 824. When the law was written down and available for study, criticism
by legal scholars prompted many fiefdoms to redraft. Ibid.
81BOBt, COMa2,ENTAI.E SU-R LES COUTUMS GENERALES DE MEAUX 444 (1683), discus-
sing Coutumes generales gard~es et observ~es au bailliage de Meaux art. 219 (1509), in
3 N.C.G. 381. See also the emphasis on jurisdiction in BEAumANom, op. cit. supra note 72,
at §§ 357-60. The jurisdictional objection to a free right of counterclaim is squarely raised
in a contemporary comment upon the customary law of Paris: FERuikaR, CORPS ET cOm-
PFMATION DE TOUS LES COM3EENTATEURS ANCIENS Er MODERNS SUR LA COUTI'hIE DE PARIS
105-06 (2d ed. 1724). Other contemporary statements include Coustunes generales du pays
et duchg'de Bourbonnois (1521), in 3 N.C.G. 1231, at 1289; Coutunes de la prevosti et
vicomt6 de Paris (1580), in 3 N.C.G. 29, at 38 n.2; BoTRIJoN, La Daorr coMMUN DE LA
FRANcE bk. 6, tit. 7, ch. 2, §§ 32-33 (3d ed. 1770) notes that counterclaims are not allowed
'in the secular court, while compensatio may be: hence, only liquidated demands may be
compensated. The consequence of allowing compensation of unliquidated demands would be
to allow by compensatio that which could not be achieved by counterclaim. Further, as to
jfrisdiction, see generally EsmriN 293-301.
82 Coutumes generales du haut pay du comte de la Marche § 101 (1521), in 4 N.C.G.
1101.
83 Es 790-92.
'84 FERR kiR, op. cit. supra note 81, at 107; 1 DicTnoNNAIRE ANALYTQ Qu DR LA couTUMi
-DE NoptwRmm 314 (1780); 3 N.C.G. 145 n.n, commenting upon Coutumes du constd et
bai~lages de Montfort Lamaury § 69 (1556), in 3 N.C.G. 141.
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cipated pernicious consequences may not have appeared. Further, royal
pressures for uniform law apparently played a major role.
Adoption of a limited counterclaim by the customary law of Paris
exemplified the change. The 1510 Coutume had flatly stated that "Coun-
terclaim, in the lay court, takes place not at all." '85 But the 1580 version
read: "A counterclaim in the secular court is not admissible unless it re-
lates to the subject of the action, and the demand in counterclaim be a
defense to the action first instituted; in this case the defendant, by means
of his defense, may make himself plaintiff."8 Commentators upon this
provision made it explicit that the demands must be so connected that one
might say they were part of the same action. Otherwise, the defendant
must seek the plaintiff in the forum of the latter's domicile.17
The Paris provision bespoke a trend: many other principalities,
duchies, and fiefdoms allowed judicial offset by the latter half of the six-
teenth century.88 In 1683, however, Bob6 noted that the custom of
Meaux had not followed Paris in allowing counterclaim; he suggested
that the Parisian provision "ought to be incorporated into -the Custom of
Meaux. , , 9
Contrast, however, the treatment of compensatio with that of counter-
claim. The provincial quibbles which impeded acceptance of counterclaim
did not apply with equal force to automatic extinction of reciprocal debts.
To allow compensatio fell short of requiring a defendant to surrender
tangible property at the behest of a judge in a foreign forum 0 Compen-
satio could, at most, reduce a plaintiff's claim to zero. In no event could
a plea of compensatio lead to an adjudication that legal relations sanc-
tioned by one lord were to be undone in the forum of another lord.91
85 Les Coutumes generales due la prevost6 et vicomt, de Paris § 75 (1510), in 3
N.C.G. 1; FERSIiRE, op. cit. supra note 81, at 103-04.
86 Coutunes de la prevost6 et vicomtM de Paris § 106 (1580), in 3 N.C.G. 29; Ferriire,
op. cit. supra note 81, at 103-04.
87 F mu!RE, op. cit. supra note 81, at 103-04.
8 8 g.g., Le couturnier dit bailhiage de Mante art. 1, § 3 (n.d.), in 3 N.C.G. 173; Cou-
turnes du comti et bailliage de Mante et Meullant § 58 (1556), in 3 N.C.G. 183; Coutumes
du bailliage de Meleun § 327 (1560), in N.C.G. 434; Coutumes du comt et bailliages de
Montlort Lamaury § 69 (1556), in 3 N.C.G. 141 (requiring special dispensation); Coutumes
generales de la citg et duch de Cambray tit. 25, §§ 52-53 (1574), in 2 N.C.G. 281; Coutumes
de la vile de Calais et pays reconquis § 223 (1583), in 1 N.C.G. 1.
89BoBm, Noms SUR LA COUTum DE PARRs 73 (1683), bound with the same author's
CO1MENTAIRE SUR LES COUTUMES GENERALES DU BAnmIAGO DE MRA-UX.
90 This "great difference" appeared clearly to the authors of comments collected in
FmuaiRE, op. it. supra note 81, at 108.
91 The question of jurisdiction to render a personal judgment raises analogous problems
in the United States today. If A seeks B in the forum of B's domicile, and B counterclaims
for an amount in excess of A's claim, the court in B's domicile is not constitutionally barred
from granting B all the relief he seeks. Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938). Adam rests
this decision upon A's "consent." This result could not obtain in medieval France. A could
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While this minimized the jurisdictional impediment, the alien character
of compensatio remained a barrier to its acceptance. But as royal power
expanded, as the customs were reduced to writing, as French scholars
revived the study of legal history, the Roman intruder came to be tolerated
if not welcomed.
In 1531, the custom of Lorris and Montargis excluded compensatio
from the secular court, 92 as did Tournay in 1552 . 3 There is no mention
of compensatio in the Coutumes de Bourbonnois of 1500,11 nor in that of
Meaux of 1509,11 nor in the old undated 6 or 155611 editions of the
customary law of Mante. Neither is it mentioned in the Coutumier de
Cambray of 1574, nor that of the Boulenois of 1550. This may mean
nothing: perhaps the custom was silent and the Roman principle em-
ployed. The collection of Norman customs does not mention compensatio,
yet Basnage made it clear that the principle was cautiously received. 8
On the other hand, many sixteenth century collections of customary
law explicitly provided for automatic compensation to greater or lesser
extent. 9 In Paris, both the 1510 and the 1580 Coutumes allowed it if
the debts were liquidated and incontestable.100 In Auvergne as of 1510,
the debts had also to be in writing.' By 1521, the Bourbon custom
allowed compensation provided the defendant pleaded the opposing debt
at the outset of plaintiff's action; the compiler of the custom declared
that jurisdictional covetousness "cannot be allowed to impede the ad-
not consent, as his personal rights were very much bound up with his feudal relation to his
own lord; B's lord could not adjudicate those rights, for to do so would invade the seigneurial
privileges of A's lord. Today, tenurial rights are all but gone as viable legal constructs; A's
property rights are his personally, and since he can dispose of them by a contract made in
the forum of B's domicile, there is no reason not to let courts of that forum adjudicate them.
92 Les coutumes anciennes de Lorris, des bailliage et prevosti de Montargis ch. 21,
art. 10 (1531), in 3 N.C.G. 829.
93 Les coustumes, stils, et usages de l'eschevinage de la ville et citi de Tournay ch. 27,
art. 1-2 (1552), in 2 N.C.G. 951.
9 4 Coustumes du pays et duch de Bourbonnois (1500), in 3 N.C.G. 1193.
95 Coutumes generales gard~es et observies au bailliage de Meaux (1509), in 3 N.C.G.
381. See BoB, op. cit. supra note 89.
9 6Le coutunier du bailliage de Mante (no date), in 3 N.C.G. 173.
97 Coutumes du comt et bailliage de Mante et Meullant (1556), in 3 N.C.G. 183.
98 1 BASNTAGE, OEUVRES 88 (4th ed. 1778). Basnage believed that a debt not at interest
could not compensate one at interest. Ibid., citing duMoulin in support of his conclusion. After
1665, however, the procedural formalities formerly prerequisite to judicial allowance of
compensatio were done away with, 1 DicTioNAome ANALYTIQUE DE LA COUTUVME DE NOR-
wzi-m 314 (1780) ; this may have broadened the operation of automatic compensatio.
9 9 B~assAuD, A HISTORY or FRENCH PRiVATE LAW 558 n.2 (1912), attributes the French
acceptance of automatic compensation to Cujas.
ioo FRuu tRE, op. cit. supra note 81, at 87-88, discussing art. 74 of the 1510 Coutumier
and art. 105 of the 1580 version.
1l0Les coutumes generales du haut et bas pays d'Auvergne ch. 18, art. 6 (1510), in 4
N.C.G. 1160.
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judication of the day to day transactions of the subjects of the realm."'
Similar rules were reduced to writing in Rheims, 1°3 the Marche in 152 1,104
Meleun in 1560,105 Montfort in 1556,106 and Calais in 1583.17
Loisel, summarizing the customary law, wrote in 1608 that com-
pensation required that "the debts one wishes to compensate be liquid and
in writing." 0 8 This, he said, was "an exception, or rather an abrogation
of the rule that a countervailing obligation does not prevent the existence
of the principal demand.""° Loisel's statement carries three connotations.
First, the rule prohibiting compensatio was subject to attack, and had
been put to rout in some jurisdictions. Second, the attack was in some
cases guised as an exception to the former rule; as Sir Henry Maine
noted," 0 a new rule travelling incognito as an exception is a significant
element in legal progress. Third, where it appeared, compensatio operated
automatically to extinguish countervailing obligations; the customary law
was moving toward the view of compensatio taken in the "written law"
of southern France.
B. The Written Law
In the district of the droit ecrit, or "written law," Roman law formed
the common and general law. Judges looked to Justinian for guidance."'
They were assisted by the revival of Roman law study and exposition
which began in Bologna in the twelfth century: the Glossators' marginal
notes, explaining, discussing and comparing the text in the scholastic man-
ner, aimed "to re-establish the authority of Roman law as living law.""
The Glossators were succeeded by the Commentators; exegesis of
Justinian's text gave way to long discussion of particular points, and
exhaustive distinctions." 3 The sixteenth century saw the growth of a
humanist school of jurisprudence. Led by Cujas in France, the humanists
102 Coustumes generates du pay et ducie de Bourbonnois §§ 37-38 (1521), in 3 N.C.G.
1231. The quoted observation is in id. at 1289.
103 Coutumes de la cit6 et ville de Rheims art. 397 (no date), in 2 N.C.G. 493.
1o Coutumes generales du haut pay du comt6 de la Marche § 100 (1521), in 4 N.C.G.
1101.
105 Coutumes du bailhiage de Meleun § 326 (1560), in 3 N.C.G. 434.
106 Coutumes du comta et bailliages de Montfort Lamaury § 68 (1556), in 3 N.C.G. 141.
107 Coutumes de la vile de Calais et pays reconquis § 222 (1583), in 1 N.C.G. 1.
1 0 8 LoisEL, op. cit. supra note 76, at § 705.
109 Ibid.
110 MA=E, ANCzcm- LAw ch. 2 (1st ed. 1861).
ll Esmrm 787. But customary anomalies developed in the South on matters left open
by Roman law, principally the hierarchy of rights and duties inherent in feudal economic
and jural relations. Id. at 787-88.
112 SoH  138. And see VINOG ADo , op. cit. supra note 78, at 44-58.
113 1 Samtmxm, op. cit. supra note 78, at § 219.
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returned to Roman law, to search out, clarify, and expound the thoughts
of the Latin lawmakers." 4
These influences molded the Corpus Iuris of Justinian into the day-to-
day rules of a feudal society. The interpretation of compensatio by courts
and scholars was later adopted by the Code Napoleon: Justinian's words
"ipso iure" were construed to mean "by operation of law alone.""' 5 In
this interpretation, compensation of cross-demands took place auto-
matically without the knowledge of the debtors at the moment the two
debts first coexisted, and to the amount of the lesser debt."' Brissaud
credits this interpretation to Cujas," 7 but Cujas was not all alone.
Pothier, writing in the eighteenth century, asserted that the lexicogra-
phers unanimously agreed that Justinian's words could bear no other
meaning.1
C. The Canon Law" 9
The ecclesiastical courts applied canon law to all matters within their
jurisdiction. The Church pressed the secular courts to apply canon law
principles as well, when it thought the welfare of men's souls was at
issue. ° The canon law purported to be, therefore, both a system of
positive law compassing the jural relations of an ecclesiastical society,
and an exposition of the principles of divine law. In its positive aspects,
it leaned heavily upon Roman law. 2' In contrast with the French written
14 Esm-szx 843-44.
115 See note 40 supra.
1 1 6 Do lAT, LEs Loix CIVrxs DANs LEuR ORDEE NATUREL 284 (1713). The cited edition
is not the first; the title page speaks of it as "Nouvelle edition, reveuE et corigle." The work
was published in segments from 1689 to 1697, in part posthumously, Domat having died in
1695. Domat's authority and influence rest upon his view that Roman law contained "nat-
ural law and written reason," and upon his systematic exposition in French rather than In
Latin. Realizing that the Roman law was entitled to, and accorded, great weight in the
courts, he sought to make that law accessible. Esnwm 845-46.
117 BRISSAUD, op. cit. supra note 99, at 558 n.2.
118 Pothier, TraitM des obligations § 635, in 2 0EuvEs 1 (Bugnet ed. 1861) [the Trait6
is hereinafter cited as Pothier, then to the section, and, if necessary to the page of volume 2
of the Oeuvres where the cited material appears]. The TraitS, of great influence upon the
codifiers, was originally published in 1761. 2 id. at ix. Pothier, as the discussion in part I of
this Comment indicates, was probably wrong in thinking compensatio was automatic at
Roman law.
Automatic compensation meant, for example, that without exception a debt bearing
interest compensated and extinguished a debt not at interest. DOmAT, op. cit. supra note 116,
at 284.
Roman law did not, however, prescribe the details of the feudal relation: that was left
to custom. In the written law of the south, as in the customary law of the north, feudal
obligations were not susceptible of compensation. Id. at 285; FEmPRut, op. cit. supra note 81,
at 99-100.
119 See generally VmooaRox-', op. cit. supra note 78, at 68-83.
12 0 EsmMy 862-64.
121 HOBBES, LxviArTHN 457 (Oakeshott ed. 1957): "For if a man consider the original
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law insistence that Roman law provided for automatic extinction of cross-
demands, the canonists allowed only judicial offset.
Cross-demands at canon law were heard before the same judge at the
same time; he rendered a single judgment adjudicating the respective
claims."2 The cross-demand could be pleaded at any time before joinder
of issue, and had the effect of "making the plaintiff into a defendant
before the same judge."' 2 3 The canonists called this form of cross-action
mnuturie petitiones--"mutual petitions." These words appear in Justinian's
Code in the treatment of compensatio: "You cannot be constrained to pay
that which you obviously owe, before there has been a response to your
mutual petition against your creditor, whom you allege is also your
debtor."'1 24 Pothier records that these words of Justinian are the basis for
a view among legal scholars that the demands coexist until set off by the
judge.-25 It is not unreasonable to suggest that the choice of the words
"mutual petitions" to head the treatment of cross-demands in the Corpus
luris Canonici,'21 and in the canonist Institutes of Lancellotti,127 reflects
insistence upon the procedural prerequisites to setoff.
In Hericourt's Les loix ecclesiastiques de France,'-" the subject is
treated under the head of "reciprocal demands"; without acknowledging
his source, he repeats the material contained in the Corpus Iuris Canonici
section on "mutual petitions." Hericourt distinguishes the judicial offset
dictated by the papal rescripts from the compensatio which would be
available in the secular court.- 9
For the canonists, of course, jurisdictional difficulties attending cross-
demands in the secular court did not exist: the law was uniform through-
of this great ecclesiastical dominion, he will easily perceive that the Papacy is no other than
the ghost of the deceased Roman empire, sitting crowned upon the grave thereof. For so did
the Papacy start up on a sudden out of the ruins of that heathen power." Theological polemic
aside, the statement is accurate as respects the relation of Roman law to ecclesiastical tem-
poral law.
122 Decretal. Gregor. IX bk. 2, tit. 4, ch. 1, in 2 Coapus Juais CAlcoNzci at cols. 256-57
(Friedberg ed. 1879).
1233 LANcELLoTTO, INsTIrUfTIoNE Juns CAlomcz tit. 9, § 1 (1704). This work, com-
missioned by Pope Paul IV as the canonical counterpart of justinian's Institutes, was first
published in 1563; it never received papal approval, but is recognized as authoritative. 1
SHmRmiAx, op. cit. supra note 78, at § 228.
124 CoDE 4,31.6.
125 Pothier § 635, at 346.
126 Decretal. Gregor. IX bk. 2, tit. 4, chs. 1-2, in 2 Cozpus Juzis CANONICI at cols.
256-57 (Friedberg ed. 1879).
27 3 LAwcELoro, op. cit. supra note 123, at tit. 9.
1 2 8 HERICOURT, Lxs Loix ECCiESIASTIQUES DE FRANcE DANs LEuR ORDEE wTATUREL (3d ed.
1771). The first edition was published in 1719.
129 Id. at D92. Pothier notes that the canonists held that a debt attested by an oath
could not be discharged by compensatio because such a means of discharge would derogate
from the letter of the promise. Pothier § 625, at 338.
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out the church. Quite simply, the canonists thought it wrong that a man
"decline to have against himself in the same action a judge whose decision
he respects as plaintiff."' 80 The canon law was, however, assiduous to
protect its own jurisdiction: a defendant sued in a secular court by a
cleric could not counterclaim about a matter cognizable by the ecclesi-
astical courts. 1 '
But the canonists' preference for judicial offset was eclipsed by those
who argued that Justinian provided for automatic compensation. The
words ipso iure, not mutuae petitiones, seemed most important to the
architects of the Code Napoleon.
D. The Codification of Compensatio
The feudal jealousies reflected in the chill welcome received by com-
pensatio were symptomatic of the struggle to unify France. Unification
was a major concern of the monarchy from the sixteenth century on, and
was pursued by reducing the customary law to writing under royal super-
vision, promulgation of royal decrees binding the whole kingdom, and
assertion of the king's place at the top of the feudal pyramid.1 82 The new
class of traders and merchants was likewise interested in breaking down
barriers to commerce, and they pressed for unity-and political and
economic freedom.33 Amid all, the phiosophes of the Enlightenment
sought and expounded the fundamental principles which ordered the
universe.34 They proclaimed three truths to the lawgivers of the French
Revolution: the law must be unified, certain, and derive its sanction from
natural reason.
Unification built upon the work of Pothier and Domat, and upon the
Coutumes-especially that of Paris." 5 That certainty was an object is
attested by the Declaration of Rights of 1791: "[T]he exercise of the
130 3 LANCErLOTTO, op. cit. supra note 123, at tit. 9, § 1.
1313 id. tit. 9, § 6.
132 EsziN 471-84, 608-53, 815-32.
133 RoLL, op. cit. supra note 11, at 154-60.
134 The writers of the Enlightenment were welcomed in some parts of Paris society.
Their tactics in reforming the thought of the 18th century Diderot describes in the metaphor
of the "strange god": "The rule of Nature and of my Trinity, against which the gates of
Hell shall not prevail, ...establishes itself very quietly. The strange god settles himself
humbly on the altar beside the god of the country. Little by little he establishes himself more
firmly. Then one fine morning he gives his neighbor a shove with his elbow and--crash l-
the idol lies upon the ground." MooRE, THREE TAcnics: TnE BACKGROUND IN MARX 95-96
(1964), quoting Diderot's Rameau's Nephew. On the influence of the Enlightenment, see
EsmEiN, L'HisToniu DU DRorr RA4NqAIS DE 1789 A 1814 at 3-5; Friedrich, The Ideological and
Philosophical Background, in THE CODe NAPoLEoN 1 (Schwartz ed. 1956).
135 Friedrich, supra note 134, at 6; EswEmE, op. cit. supra note 134, at 329-30. Esmein
cited Domat, Pothier and Bourjon as preeminent among jurists whose work directly influ-
enced the codifiers.
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natural rights of each man has no limits other than those that ensure to
other members of society enjoyment of those same rights. These limits
can be determined only by statute." '186 As Cambacres said to the Conseil
d'Etat in presenting an early Code draft: "[I] t is indispensable to sub-
stitute for the old laws a code ... which is at once the principle of social
welfare and the safeguard of public morality.'1 7 These same statements
make evident the natural law bias of the revolutionary leaders.
Of the thrde goals-unification, certainty, and harmony with the
natural law-the revolution emphasized natural law. When Napoleon
ascended to the Consulate, however, he sought principally unification and
certainty. 88 Either way, the treatment of compensatio was the same.
The 1796 pre-Napoleon draft of the Civil Code contains six sections
on compensatio. One section sets forth its operation: cross-demands, even
those arising from different transactions, are automatically extinguished.8 9
Another section limits its application to liquid, presently due debts.140
A third provides that the consequences of automatic extinction include
cessation of the running of interest.' 4 ' Other sections exclude "spend-
thrift legacies," interests of the state, and obligations to return a specific
chattel from the operation of compensatio.'1
The principles of "right reason" sought to be embodied in these sec-
tions happened also to be a synthesis of the French law of compensatio
that developed during the 18th century. For the jurist of the Age of
Reason, therefore, compensatio was respected for its venerable origins,
and doubly to be praised for fitting into the natural order of things.1
4 1
Rationalists could accept the notion of automatic extinction of reciprocal
obligations with the same ease that attended the reification of other
political, ethical, and legal abstractions. This philosophical predisposition
was supported by legal history and custom: Domat and Bourjon, in sum-
marizing, respectively, the written and customary law, agreed on the
186 Quoted in Tune, The Grand Outlines of the Code, in Tan CODE NAPOLEON 22
(Schwartz ed. 1956).
18 7 Projet du Code Civil (1796), Discours Preliminaire at 1. This was the third draft
of the Code, the first having been rejected as too cumbersome and ill-drafted, the second (a
scant 297 articles) as too short. EsmaNw, op. cit. supra note 134, at 248-49.
188 Friedrich, supra note 134, at 5-6.
18 9 Projet du Code Civil § 802 (1796).
140 Id. § 803.
141 Id. § 805.
142 Id. § 807.
143 That compensatio was a principle of natural law, see, e.g., ZEiLLER, DAs NATURLICHE
PaivAT-RECHT § 119 (1808): "All contracts have in common certain grounds of extinction
regarding the rights and obligations founded thereon. Such are: . . . compensatio as a
shorthand payment, through liberating the creditor by the debtor from an obligation of the
same type to be performed at that very time." See also 5 PumsNopx, THE LAw op NATuEE
Aw NATIoNs ch. 11, §§ 5-6 (Kennett. transl. 4th ed. 1729).
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basic principles of compensatio.144 But the influence of Pothier far sur-
passed that of anyone else; he, too, urged a broadly-applicable law of
automatic compensatio.145
Compensation, wrote Pothier, is a payment. In payment of an obliga-
tion, one cannot ask the creditor to accept a substance other than that
due him. Thus, the two debts must be in the same coin: money for
money, grain for grain, oil for oil. 146 Further, the debts must be fully
due, and liquidated; if one is indeterminate, compensation cannot take
place. Pothier gives no reason why this should be so, considering it suffi-
cient to cite the Roman text.147 He also held that the debt must be due
between the same persons, and in the same right. Thus, a debt due from
a husband could not be compensated against a debt due the wife: a debt
due A as executor of T could not be set off against a debt due from A in
his personal capacity.14 Pothier's notion of automatic compensation was
derived from the words "ipso iure" in Justinian's Code,' and by induction
from the effects of coinpensatio which the Code and Digest set out: for
example, suit upon the excess of the larger debt over the smaller, and
cessation of the course of interest.149
Pothier's treatment formed, in the main, the basis of the Napoleonic
Code's articles on compensatio. The Code followed Pothier rather than
the 1796 Draft in allowing debts which were fungibles for fungibles, as
well as money for money, to be compensated. 15 ° While the requirement
of liquidity was retained, debts determined in amount by market prices
published each 'day in the press were considered sufficiently determinate
to be susceptible of compensation.' 5 ' In other details, the Code Napoleon
iterated the rules stated by Pothier.15s
The requirement of liquidity provoked some discussion in the Conseil
d'Etat, with one member, Maleville, proposing that compensatio also be
14 4 DomAT, op. cit. supra note 116, bk. 4, tit. 2; BoURjoN, LE DROIT COMMUN DE LA
FRA1wCE bk. 6, tit. 7, ch. 2 (3d ed. 1770).
145Pothier §§ 623-40; see Friedrich, supra note 134, at 6. Pothier also gained great
favor in England and America, a translation of his treatise on obligations being published
in both countries. PLucxN=, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CommoN LAw 265-66 (2d ed.
1936).
1 4 6 Pothier §§ 624, 626.
147 Id. § 628.
14 8 Id. §§ 630, 632.
149 Id. §§ 635-36.
150 Code Civil §§ 1289-91 (1804). The citations to the Napoleonic Code are taken from
CoN mNyscE Du CODE Civ (1805), which contains the text of the sections, proposed amend-
ments, and the discussion in the Conseil d'Etat. Pothier is discussed in text accompanying
note 145 supra, and in note 118 supra. The 1796 Draft is discussed in text accompanying
notes 139-42 supra, and in note 137 supra.
151 Code Civil § 1291 (1804).
152 Code Civil §§ 1289-99 (1804).
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allowed when the amount of the debt was not certain, but capable of
easily being made certain. 53 This, said Maleville, was the Roman pro-
cedure." 4 His colleagues, however, argued that compensation automati-
cally and of right occurs only between liquidated sums. Maleville's point,
argued Treilhard, is valid, but has nothing to do with this sort of situation.
"When the action presents itself in the circumstances which M. Maleville
has proposed, the judge, deferring to equity, will allow a delay for pay-
ment to take place, giving the debtor time to make his credit liquid and
thereby accomplish compensation."' 5 Another member said that interest
did not cease to run upon the respective obligations until both were liqui-
dated, demonstrating that there was no distinction between debts difficult
and those easy to render certain in amount: neither were susceptible of
automatic compensation.!"5 The requisite of liquidity was retained, the
judge's discretion to do as Treilhard suggested being acknowledged but
not codified.1 7 The policy of "avoiding the circuity of two payments"' 58
was limited by the policy of preventing defendants from prolonging the
action with questionable claims propounded against debts clearly due.' 59
This treatment of compensatio spread to the countries which adopted
the Code Napoleon. The Code, and Pothier, also exerted an indirect
influence upon the law of cross-demands in England and America. The
notion was pervasive that natural reason required that cross-demands be
mutually extinguished.
III
MANSFIELD AND STORY
Both Mansfield and Story wrote of setoff; both were scholars and
admirers of Roman and civil law.10 Each believed his conclusions to
rest upon natural reason. Mansfield examined setoff in the statutes and
precedents, summarized and commented, but innovated little.' Story
took Mansfield's comments, combined them with the French and Roman
153 5 CONFERENCE DU CODE CIVIL 124-25 (1805).
15 4 He had support in Justinian. See CODE 4.31.14, which can be read as allowing un-
liquidated claims which are not difficult of proof; the section may mean, however, that
easily-proven liquidated claims are the only ones permitted.
155 5 CONFERENCE DU CODE CrvIm 125-26 (1805).
156 Id. at 126. See text accompanying notes 6-9 supra.
157 5 id. at 126.
158 The phrase occurs in Do -AT, op. cit. supra note 116, at bk. 4, tit. 2, § 1, II 2.
1r9 CODE 4.31.14; 5 CONFERENCE DU CODE Cnrm 125 (1805).
160 See PLuCKNETT, op. cit. supra note 145, at 222-24; Leslie, Similarities in Lord Mans-
field's and Joseph Story's View of Fundamental Law, 1 Am. J. LEGAL. HsT. 278 (1957).
101 See his opinions in Howlet v. Strickland, 1 Cowp. 56, 98 Eng. Rep. 965 (K.B. 1774);
Green v. Farmer, 4 Burr. 2214, 98 Eng. Rep. 154 (K.B. 1768); Baskerville v. Brown, 2 Burr.
1229, 97 Eng. Rep. 804 (K.B. 1761); Collins v. Collins, 2 Burr. 820, 97 Eng. Rep. 579 (K.B.
1759).
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law as he understood it, and regretted that compensatio had not been
adopted by the common law.162 Story accepted at face value the French
interpretation of the Roman texts: compensatio takes place automatically
at the moment liquidated cross-demands coexist. In writing upon com-
pensatio he therefore combines as no other influential legal scholar of
the early nineteenth century exegesis of the civil law rules with advocacy
of their adoption. By virtue of Story's advocacy and influence, one may
infer that he influenced the progenitor of Section 440 of the California
Code of Civil Procedure.
A. Early Common Law and Chancery Practice
Mansfield wrote against a background of one hundred years of En-
glish cross-demand procedure. In the seventeenth century, commissioners
in bankruptcy may have admitted setoffs between the bankrupt and a
creditor to the extent of the smaller claim.6 3 Chancery likewise allowed
a setoff when the bankrupt or his representative sued a creditor. 6 4 Mutual
dealings between the bankrupt and another apparently led even the law
side to declare the respective demands set off, so that the creditor was
made to pay "that which appears due to the bankrupt at the foot of the
account."' 65
Setoff was recognized by statute in 1705, but limited to the case of
bankruptcy.' 66 Chancery, however, continued to allow setoff in other
cases, where equity and justice demanded it.167 In 1729, Parliament
enacted a more general setoff statute, 6" which was slightly expanded in
1735.169
Neither case law nor statute provided that setoff operate automatically
to extinguish the respective claims. Setoff, or stoppage, as it was also
termed, allowed the defendant to put in his claim as of the time of the
suit; further, there was no penalty in saving the claim for a separate
action' 7 The English came closer, therefore, to reconventio, or mutual
162 2 STORY, COmuENTARIS ON EQm= JuRisPRuDENCs §§ 1433-49 (2d ed. 1839) [here-
inafter cited as STORY]. There are many editions of Story; this one is chosen as having been
published in time for David Dudley Field to have read it.
163 Loyd, The Development of Set-Off, 64 U. PA. L. Rav. 541, 547 (1916).
164 Id. at 547-49.
'
6 5 Anonymous, 1 Mod. 215, 86 Eng. Rep. 837 (C.P. 1676).
1664 Anne, c. 17, § 11 (1705), amended by 5 Geo. 2, c. 30, § 28 (1732).
167 See Greene v. Darling, 10 Fed. Cas. 1144, 1147-48 (No. 5765) (C.C.D.R.I. 1828),
tracing the practice in Chancery before and after the enactment of the statute of setoff.
1682 Geo. 2, c. 22, § 13 (1729).
169 8 Geo. 2, c. 24, §§ 4-5 (1735).
170 Baskervilie v. Brown, 2 Burr. 1229, 97 Eng. Rep. 804 (K.B. 1761). But in that case,
Mansfield remarked that it was "litigious and vexatious" of Baskerville not to have set up
his claim in Brown's action. Id. at 1231, 97 Eng. Rep. at 805.
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petitions, than to compensatio. Lord Chief Justice Gilbert, writing in 1758,
attributed the cross-bill in Chancery to the civil law reconventio.'
Though automatic extinction of cross-demands did not take place as
of right, Chancery had been quick to infer an agreement that it occur.
As Jekyll, M.R., said in 1723:
It is true, stoppage is no payment at law, nor is it, of itself,
payment in equity, but then a very slender agreement for discounting
or allowing one debt out of the other, will make it a payment, be-
cause this prevents circuity of action and multiplicity of suits, which
is not favored in law, much less in equity.7 2 _
Jekyll may, of course, have referred to the adjudicative act of setting
off as "payment"; but his language in context seems rather to posit an
implied agreement that reciprocal demands shall be set off automatically,
only the balance being due at any given moment. But Jekyll spoke six
years before the statute of setoff: when it was passed, the statute became
the standard to which all questions of setoff were referred.
The eighteenth century rules articulated in response to the statute
confined the right of setoff to liquidated, or easily ascertainable, de-
mands. Setoff was a defense only; the defendant had to bring a separate
suit to collect so much of his claim as exceeded that of the plaintiff. 4
The setoff had to be due the defendant at the commencement of the
action,175 and due him in the same capacity as that in which he was sued. 76
This was the law that Mansfield confronted.
B. Mansfield's Contribution
In Green v. Farmer,177 plaintiff sued in trover for bolts of cloth left
with the defendant to be dyed. The defendant sought to set off the cost
of dyeing previous orders. In reaching his conclusion that setoff was not
available, Mansfield said:
Natural equity says, that cross-demands should compensate each other,
171 GILBERT, THE HISTORY AND PRACTICE OF THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY 45-47
(1758).
172 Jeffs v. Wood, 2 P. Wins. 128, 129, 24 Eng. Rep. 668, 669 (Ch. 1723). Cf. BARBOVE,
LAW Or Sar-OWp 193 (1841). Mansfield held in Collins v. Collins, 2 Burr. 820, 825, 97 Eng.
Rep. 579, 582 (K.B. 1759), that by the statute of setoff, "stoppage ... is become equivalent
to actual payment: and a balance shall be struck, as in equity and justice it ought to be!'
He apparently means that setoff is as complete a defense as payment, so that the plaintiff
may be nonsuited if the defendant shows an equal or greater demand owed himself from
the plaintiff.
178 Howlet v. Stricldand, 1 Cowp. 56, 98 Eng. Rep. 965 (K.B. 1774).
174 Baskerville v. Brown, 2 Burr. 1229, 1231, 97 Eng. Rep. 804, 805 (K.B. 1761).
17 5 MONTAGU, TsE LAW OF SET-O'r 20 (2d Am. ed. 1825).
176 Id. at 24-40.
1774 Burr. 2214, 98 Eng. Rep. 154 (K.B. 1768).
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by deducting the less sum from the greater; and that the difference is
the only sum which can be justly due.
But positive law, for the sake of the forms of proceeding and con-
venience of trial, has said that each must sue and recover separately. 178
To one learned in the civil law, "compensate" clearly meant the automatic
extinction of cross-demands. Did Mansfield mean to affirm and adopt this
principle? Or did he wish only to advert to the common law rule by way
of contrast with a less strict mode of proceeding, and in doing so to use
a word which had no technical significance in the common law courts?
The latter seems improbable. Mansfield's colleagues were likely to
have at least a nodding acquaintance with Roman and French law; or
Scots law, which was based on the Roman. Further, Mansfield himself
was a student of Roman law in two important ways. First, he had a respect
for the Roman legal tradition based upon an understanding and study
of it. Second, he came to the bar as a Scots lawyer. Scotland, with a
system of jurisprudence independent of England to this day, is a civil
law jurisdiction. Compensatio, translated compensation, was known and
used in Scots law.'7  Under that law, however, compensation did not
operate as a payment, to stop the running of the statute of limitations,
though it may have operated automatically to stop the running of
interest. 18 0
Mansfield was schooled in this law, as well as the classical Roman
law. It is a permissible surmise that he meant to state the consonance of
the Roman rule with the principles of natural justice. Story interpreted
Mansfield as intending to state the cross-demand procedure in Chancery:
where there were cross-demands involving a natural equity, the Chancellor
would declare them extinguished to the extent of the lesser debt.181 This
1781d. at 2220, 98 Eng. Rep. at 157.
179 See 2 BELL, ComfmENTARms ON rHE LAW OF ScoTLAN *126-*40; STAe, Tn INSTI-
TuTiOS or T=E LAW OF ScoTwm bk. 1, tit. 18, § 6 (2d ed. 1693). Lord Stair states that
compensatio takes place ipso iure to stop the running of interest, but that it must be invoked
by either party or by a third person. When invoked, it operates retrospectively to the time
when the demands first coexisted. Id. at 153-54. See Queen v. Bishop of Aberdeen (1543),
set forth in BAixOuR, PRACTicKS 349 (1754), the 1962 Stair Society facsimile edition of which
was consulted. That case denied the Bishop compensatio, perhaps because he attempted to
assert his cross-demand against the sovereign. Scotland clearly had compensatio after 1592,
when the Scottish Parliament passed a statute providing for it. 3 THE AcTs oF THE PAR=a-
orENTs  ScoTmA~ 573 (Thomson ed. 1814): "THAT compensatioun de liquido ad liquidumn
be admittit in all Jugementis. Oure Souerane Lord and estatis of parliament statutis and
Ordanis that ony debt de liquido ad liquidum instantlie verifiet be wreit or aith of the partie
befoir the geving of decreit, be admittit be all the Jugis within this realm be way of excep-
tioun. Bot not eftir the geving thairof, In the suspension or in reduction of pe same decreit."
(The cited collection was compiled at the direction of the British Crown.)
180 BELL, op. cit. supra note 179, at *130; STAIR, op. cit. supra note 179, bk. 1, tit. 18,
§ 6, at 153-54.
181 SToRY §§ 1432, 1435; Greene v. Darling, 10 Fed. Cas. 1144, 1147 (No. 5765)
(C.C.D.R.I. 1828) (Story, J., on circuit).
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view, and Story's favorable comment upon compensatio in Rome and
France, deserve closer attention.
C. Joseph Story
In an 1828 federal case, Greene v. Darling,'2 Justice Story, on circuit,
considered setoff in detail. Reviewing the cases in England and America,
he set forth two propositions. First, absent a statute of setoff, and
absent reasons of equity, the bare existence of mutual unconnected debts
between plaintiff and defendant would not move the Chancellor to decree
a setoff. Second, no right of setoff would travel with a note; thus, a subse-
quent holder was not in danger of having his action on the note defeated
by the obligor's claim against the original payee.
The first proposition was based on the absence of any evidence of
"mutual credit" to justify equity intervening. In his Commentaries on
Equity Jurisprudence, Story defined mutual credit as
a knowledge on both sides of an existing debt due to one party, and a
credit by the other party, founded on, and trusting to such debt, as
a means of discharging it. Thus, for example, if A. should be indebted
to B. in the sum of £2,000 on his own bond, the bonds being payable
at different times, the nature of the transaction would lead to the
presumption, that there was a mutual credit between the parties, as
to the £2,000, as an ultimate set-off, pro tanto, from the debt of
£10,000.18 3
Were the bonds payable at the same time, it would be practically certain
that a compensation was intended. Unless the plaintiff could give a com-
pelling reason not to, equity would enforce a setoff.18 4
Story discussed his second proposition in these terms:
Where a chose in action is assigned, . . . the assignee takes it subject
to all the equities existing between the original parties, as to that very
chose in action, so assigned. But that is very different from admitting,
that he takes subject to all equities subsisting between the parties as to
other debts or transactions. . . . An assignment of a chose in action.
conveys merely the rights, which the assignor then possesses to that
thing. But such an assignment does not necessarily draw after it all
other equities of an independent nature. Then, again, what is the right
of setoff? By our law it is not a compensation, balancing debts pro
tanto .... "I5
Justice Story's exposition in Greene v. Darling was an account of the
case law of setoff in 1828; Story regarded it as sufficiently accurate to
cite his opinion extensively in his Commentaries on Equity Jurispru-
182 Supra note 181.
18s3 SToiy § 1435, at 659-60.
184 1d. § 1435, at 660.
18s 10 Fed. Cas. at 1149.
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dence."'8 Story did more than state rules of law in the Commentaries, how-
ever; he discussed compensatio at Roman and French law, citing Justin-
ian, Domat, and Pothier 8 Changing his style from expositor of the law
as it was, to advocate of rules of law that ought to be, Story concluded
it "a matter of regret" that the principles of Roman compensatio
have not been transferred to their full extent into our system of Equityjurisprudence. Why, indeed, in all cases of mutual debts, independently
of any notion of mutual credit, Courts of Equity should not have at
once supported and enforced the doctrine of the universal right of set-
off, as a matter of conscience and natural equity, it is not easy to say.
Having affirmed the natural equity, it seems difficult to account for
the ground, upon which they have refused the proper relief founded
upon it.... The doctrine of compensation has, indeed, been felicitously
said to be among those things, quae jure aperto nituntur [which to be
appreciated need but to be seen] .188
Story recognized and accepted the French view that compensatio
takes place automatically; the paragraph quoted seems to advocate that
all mutual debts which the civil law would compensate should be, at
common law, extinguished to the amount they are equal and from the
time they coexist. But the quoted paragraph is ambiguous: it first speaks
of adopting the "principles" of compensatio, next of the "doctrine" of
compensatio, and finally of adopting "it" as all the Roman law countries
have done.18 9 Perhaps Story meant only to say that judicial offset should
be allowed in all cases where the civil law allows compensatio. Whatever
the intended thrust of his elliptical advocacy, Story evidently affirmed the
reason and justice of the civil law rule as constructed by Pothier from
fragments of Justinian.
Story's reputation, the fame of Greene v. Darling, the pervasive in-
fluence of his Commentaries, the language of his advocacy: these allow
an inference that Field drew the principle of what is now California Code
of Civil Procedure section 440 largely from Story, supplemented by
Field's own acquaintance with the civil law. This contention deserves
closer examination.
IV
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 440
A. New York
David Dudley Field began to write and agitate about reform of civil
procedure in 1839; 190 he influenced passage of a New York constitutional
186 STORY § 1436 n.1.
1871d. §§ 1438-44.
188 Id. § 1444.
189 Ibid.
190 H. M. FiEU,, THE Limz or DAVID DuDLEY FIELD 46 (1898).
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amendment of 1846 providing for reform, 9 :1 and took his place as one of
three Commissioners on Practice and Pleading.'92 The first installment
of the Code of Civil Procedure was reported in February 1848 and passed
in April.193 It abolished the forms of action and sought to simplify plead-
ing; the distinction between law and equity was, in part, maintained. As
the 1848 Code did not provide for cross-demands, and as it left the
former law standing where its provisions did not run, the New York law
of setoff remained as it had been before: roughly like the English.'9 4
In 1850, the Commissioners reported a complete Code, annotated and
discussed. 95 By that time, the opposition to codification had grown
among judges and legislators; the 1850 Proposed Code was never adopted
in its entirety.190 Instead, the 1848 Code was amended in 185 117 and
1852.19 The 1852 amendments incorporated, with minor changes, the
1850 Proposed Code section defining a counterclaim. 99 The Proposed
Code allowed a counterclaim where the defendant's demand arose from
the contract or transaction sued upon, or was "connected with the subject
of the action"; also, when the plaintiff's demand arose "on obligation,"
the defendant could plead "any other cause of action arising also on
obligation, and existing at the commencement of the action."200
The New York legislature, however, rejected section 648 of the 1850
Proposed Code:
When cross-demands have existed between persons, under such cir-
191 Id. at 46-47; Reppy, The Field Codification Concept, in DAVID DUnxEY FrIL CEN-
TENARY ESSAYS 31-32 (Reppy ed. 1949).
192 FI.LD, op. cit. supra note 190, at 49. The original commission included Nicholas Hill,
David Graham, and Arphaxad Loomis, Field being rejected as too radical. Hill soon resigned
and the legislature appointed Field in his stead.
103 FmELD, op. cit. supra note 190, at 49; Reppy, supra note 191, at 33-34; N.Y. Laws
ch. 379 (1848).
294 Reppy, supra note 191, at 34; N.Y. Laws ch. 379, §§ 388-90 (1848). The New York
setoff statute was originally borrowed from that of Pennsylvania in 1714, Loyd, supra note
163, at 558-59; 1 COLONIAL LAws oF NEw YoRx 827 (1894). The act was similar to the
English statute. New York expanded its setoff provisions in 1813, but again constricted them
in 1830. N.Y. Laws ch. 56 (1813); BARBOUR, LAW oF SET-orF 25 (1841). See Reab v.
McAlister, 8 Wend. 109 (N.Y. Ct. Corr. Err. 1831), construing the 1813 and 1830 statutes
together and commenting upon their differences. But see Duncan v. Lyon, 3 Johns Ch. 271
(N.Y. Ch. 1818), in which Chancellor Kent discusses the civil law and statutory setoff.
195Their Final Report was dated Dec. 31, 1849, but was printed with the Proposed
Code in 1850. See HEPBUur, THE HrsToRIcAL DEVELoPwENT OF CODE PLEADING § 141 (1897)
[hereinafter cited as HEPBURN].
196 See, e.g., the acerb comments upon the Code in Roscoe v. Maison, 7 How. Pr. 121,
123 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1852); HEPBURN § 141.
197 N.Y. Laws chs. 2, 479 (1851).
195 N.Y. Laws ch. 392 (1852).
199N.Y. Laws ch. 392, § 150 (1852).
2 0 0 COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADING, PROPOSED CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
REPORTED DEcEmBER 31, 1849 § 646 (1850) [hereinafter cited as 1850 PRoPosED CODE].
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cumstances, that if one had brought an action against the other, a
counterclaim could have been set up, neither can be deprived of the
benefit thereof, by the assignment or death of the other, but the two
demands shall be deeme.d compensated, so far as they equal each other.
Where did Field draw this language and what did he mean by it? To
neither question is there a sure answer. A persuasive argument can be
made that David Field drew the inspiration for 1850 Proposed Code
section 648 from the Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence. There are,
however, other contemporary statements couched in the language of the
civil law; they, too, deserve examination. Mansfield's dictum, that natural
equity says cross-demands should be compensated,210 was, of course, a
famous utterance. It occurred, for example, on the first page of the first
English treatise on setoff, published in London late in the eighteenth
century. This work, by Montagu, was also widely used in America." 2
Montagu was displaced in America by Barbour's work on setoff,213
which, designed for the American practitioner, particularly detailed the
New York law. Barbour did not acknowledge his evident debt to Mans-
field, but he said "it is a principle of natural reason and justice that a
claim due from the plaintiff in an action, to the defendant, should com-
pensate the demand sued for, as far as it will go, and that the balance
only should be recovered. 20 4
And in Reab v. McAlister,205 an 1831 New York case, these words
appear:
There is a natural equity, especially as to claims arising out of the
same transaction, that one claim should compensate the other, and
that the balance only should be recovered. This natural equity was by
the civil law extended even to unconnected claims which were liqui-
dated or were capable of liquidation by mere computation. But the
common law of England required ... separate actions ... .206
But common law reports and treatises were not all that Field had to
draw upon.
Pothier's work on obligations was familiar, principally in a two-volume
edition by Evans2 7 Evans' first volume was a barely-adequate transla-
tion of Pothier. The second volume contained annotations of the first,
with comparison of civil and common law rules. Evans' note "Of Com-
201 Green v. Farmer, 4 Burr. 2214, 2220, 98 Eng. Rep. 154, 157 (K.B. 1768).
2 02 MoNTAG-U, THE LAW OF SET-oFr 1 (2d Am. ed. 1825). The book was originally
published in 1801.
203 BARBouR, LAw or SET-orF (1841) ; see Barbour's just evaluation of Montagu in his
Preface at v.2 041d. at 22-23.
205 8 Wend. 109 (N.Y. Ct. Corr. Err. 1831).
206 Id. at 115.
207 PoTmi, LAW OF OBLiGATONS (Evans transl. 3d Am. ed. 1853).
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pensation, or setoff" begins: "It is evidently a principle of natural reason
and justice, that when two parties are mutually indebted, the balance
only shall be paid; and that one of the parties shall not be compellable
to pay the debt which he has incurred, and be left to sue for that to which
he is entitled. 2
0
Add to this David Field's evident familiarity with the civil law;
2 9
for example, his proposed counterclaim section adopts the civil law term
"obligation" instead of "contract." Division III of the Field Civil Code,
in arrangement and content, owes an evident debt to the Code Napoleon.210
Why, of all the available influences, single out Story? The answer lies
in his treatment of assigned cross-demands, with which 1850 Proposed
Code Section 648 principally deals. For of all the common law writers,
Story alone considers the two matters side by side; he alone commends
the civil law rule of compensation not only as a principle of natural
justice but as a workable rule of practice.m 2 '
To accept this view, or to reject it, is not to end the inquiry; the
language of section 648 is ambiguous. What did Field mean to enact?
Does the statute mean only that assignment of a note carries with it the
counterclaims subsisting against the assignor and in favor of the obligor
of the note, which claims may be set off by a judge at the time of suit?
This reading would give effect to section 648's command that "when
cross demands" which could be counterclaims "have existed between
persons.., neither shall be deprived of the benefit thereof by the assign-
ment ... of the other" by allowing these demands to be "deemed com-
pensated"-that is, set off-when the assignee sued the obligor. "Com-
pensate," by this view, does not import civil law principles but is a generic
term denoting judicial offset. This reading would overrule Greene v.
Darling = and allow setoff against assignees even when the defendant-
obligor could not show some equitable reason justifying it; the same
treatment would be given claims of one sued by an executor on obligations
arising in the decedent's lifetime.
A second possible reading would be that two demands which coexist
and satisfy the counterclaim requirement shall automatically extinguish
each other "so far as they are equal." Thus, when an assignee or executor
208 2 id. at 96.
209 See Parma, History of the Adoption of the Codes of California, 22 L. LIn. J. 8, 19
(1929) ; FIElD, op. cit. supra note 190, at 44; David Field contrasted and discussed several
European Codes in a letter to members of the California Bar in 1870. CortIUssIoN YOR THE
REVLSION AND REFORm oF TE LAWS, LAW RFxORm CORBESPONDENCE BETWEEN TnE REVISION
ComniSsIon AxD DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 11-13 (1871).
2 10 Parma, supra note 209, at 19.
211 See text accompanying notes 182-88 supra.
212 10 Fed. Cas. 1144 (No. 5765) (C.C.D.R.I 1828). See text accompanying notes 182-
86 supra.
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sues, the judge must recognize this legal payment by adjudicating, or
"deeming," the demands to have been "compensated." By this view, the
words "neither can be deprived of the benefit thereof, by the assignment
or death of the other," illustrate, but do not limit, the operation of the
section. For, if the word "compensate" means automatic extinction, the
original parties to a note or obligation can plead this "legal payment"
as well between themselves as against an assignee or executor. Field,
read this way, adopts Story's suggestion in Greene v. Darling that com-
pensatio is one way to solve the problem of setoff against assigned
claims.21
3
Which of the two, if either, expresses Field's intent is impossible to
say. Field did choose the word "compensate." To a French jurist, the
word means but one thing: automatic extinction of cross-demands. Field
cannot have escaped knowing that; the setting of the word among provi-
sions dealing with cross-demands may demonstrate an intention to use it
in its technical sense. But again, "compensation" might easily be a generic
term for cancelling cross-demands. Evans, like so many who translate
"compensatio," rendered it "setoff"; the words may have been, in some
minds, interchangeable. Field may have meant to adopt "compensate,"
a word without technical meaning in the common law, solely to express
his new thoughts about cross-demands; the term "counterclaim" was,
after all, Field's innovation.214 And Story was unclear in his advocacy of
civil law compensation;215 did he mean only that his holding in Greene v.
Darling should be overruled, or that the civil law rule should be adopted
without limit?
Field's annotations to the 1850 Proposed Code illuminate this question
only partially. Field notes, in discussing his section on counterclaim, that
setoff is quite limited in its operation, and recoupment is a fairly recent
court-made cross-demand, 216 confined to claims arising from the trans-
action sued upon. He proposes "to open the door still wider" with the
counterclaim section, "and to admit many cross-demands, now excluded.
Further experience may show, that the door should be opened wider
still. 2 17 Field seems to be referring, in his "door-opening" metaphor, to an
increase in the number of demands which may be set off, not to a change
218 Id. at 1148-49.
214 John Norton Pomeroy, in a series of articles written after California's codification,
excoriated Field's semantic inventiveness, which he found indulged throughout the Field
Codes. Pomeroy, The True Method of Interpreting the Civil Code, 3 WEST COAST REPORTER
585, 657, 717, 4 WEST COAST REPORTER 1, 49, 109, 145 (1884). Pomeroy's initial excoriation
of the codifier's "constant, but wholly unnecessary practice of abandoning well known legal
terms and phrases" appears at 3 WEST COAST REPORTER 586.
215 STORY § 1144.
216 See note 9 supra.
217 1850 PROPOSED CODE § 646, Commissioners' Note.
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in the manner in which they may be set off. His language does not bespeak
a radical change in cross-demand procedure but a short step toward
reform.
A final matter: Civil law compensatio was available only for liquidated
demands; Field's counterclaim provided for unliquidated cross-demands.
Section 648 adopted the counterclaim as the measure of when compensa-
tion is allowed. To suppose that Field intended to enact automatic com-
pensation is to suppose that he meant not only to import the civil law
rule, but to go far beyond it. This is improbable. It is reasonable to
suppose that Field would have announced such a startling innovation with
some explanation of his intention, especially in view of the section's
limping prose. But section 648 was given not a syllable of annotation.
Whatever David Field's intent, and whatever his inspiration, the
elliptical language of 1850 Proposed Code Section 648 was not adopted
in New York. Legislative approbation was first given it in California.
Twenty-three years after its 1851 adoption, section 440 took on its present
form, and came to require unmistakably automatic extinction of cross-
demands. The men who amended section 440 could scarcely have escaped
knowing the impact of their language upon the scope of the section's
operation.
B. California
As the Final Report of the New York Commissioners on Practice and
Pleadings and the 1850 Proposed Code neared completion, in December
1849, Stephen Field came to California."" He was elected to the Assembly
in 1850 and began his service at Sacramento in January 1851.219 By
Stephen Field's own account: "I took up the Code of Civil Procedure, as
reported by the Commissioners in New York, remodelled it so as to adapt
it to the different conditions of things and the different organization of the
courts in California, and secured its passage."22 0 Of all Field's statements
about his legislative prowess-and he claims credit for much of the
legislation enacted during his two-year term221 -he may with most justice
be honored for introducing the 1850 Proposed Code into California.
The California Civil Practice Act of 1850,2" borrowed from the New
York Act of 1848,23 had abolished in some measure the distinction be-
218 S. FiELD, EARLY DAYS ix CALToRNiA 9-11 (1880); Pomeroy, Introductory Sketch,
in Sos.ia AccouxT OF Tm WORK OF STEPHEN J. Fiarn 11 (1881); this sketch was amended
and, as amended, approved by Field himself. See Letter from Stephen 3. Field to John N.
Pomeroy, June 21, 1881, in the Rare Books Department of the Main Library, University
of California, Berkeley.
219 S. FELD, op. cit. suPra note 218, at 24, 56-65, 221-23.
2201d. at 76.
221Id. at 73-81, 85-89.
222 Cal. Stats. Ch. 142 (1850).
223 Contrary to oft-expressed supposition, see, e.g., HAZARD & LouisFL, CASES ON PA xu-
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tween law and equity. The Civil Practice Act of 1851 enacted David
Field's Proposed Code of 1850. In California's 1851 Act, section 48
repeated almost without change section 648 of the 1850 Proposed Code.
With that enactment, California became the first state to enact David
Field's system of pleading in the form in which he finally expounded it. 24
There were, however, no reported cases construing Civil Practice Act
section 48 when the California Code Commissioners drafted and an-
notated the 1872 California Code of Civil Procedure. The Code Commis-
sioners, in adopting Civil Practice Act section 48 as Code of Civil
Procedure section 440, noted:
Although a party may set up an equitable defense to an action at
law, his remedy is not confined to that proceeding. He may let the judg-
ment go against him at law, and file his bill in equity for relief.225
This language implies that section 440 has to do with equitable setoff in
an action at law; hence, the section would merely overrule Greene v.
Darling.226 That, in the Commissioners' view, the equitable cross-demand
can be saved for another action indicates that it has not been automatically
extinguished by the plaintiff's demand.
The Commissioners changed the text of Civil Practice Act section 48
in drafting section 440 of the Code of Civil Procedure, adding a new
sentence at the end:
But a claim existing in favor of the maker of a negotiable instrument
and against a holder after maturity, intermediate between the payee
and the last holder, is not a cross-demandPa7
This addition was evidently intended to protect the negotiability of com-
mercial paper.'
But neither the Code of Civil Procedure nor section 440 were in final
ING AND PROCEDURE 37 (1962), Stephen Field did not introduce the Field Code into California.
He only brought the latest edition. Elisha 0. Crosby, chairman of the Judiciary Committee
of the state senate, drafted California's 1850 Civil Practice Act, using the New York Act of
1848 as a guide. Parma, supra note 209, at 12; HISTORY OF THE BENC1 AND BAR OF CAI-
PORiA 48-49 (Shuck ed. 1901). Crosby was also famous as the author, or co-author, of
the report urging the legislature to adopt the common law rather than the civil law. Id. at
48-53; 1 Cal. 588 (1850).
224 By virtue of other states following either the California Civil Practice Act of 1851,
or the 1850 Proposed Code, the Field section on compensation of cross-demands was intro-
duced into the law of other jurisdictions. Hmu nRN §§ 88-122; CLARX, CODE PLr.mA~Nc § 106,
at 680 n.172 (2d ed. 1947); KAN. GxE. STATS. § 60-715 (1949); NE. REv. STATS. § 25-818
(1943); O=A. STATS. § 12-278; MONT. STATS. § 93-3409 (1964); Omo REv. CODE § 2309.19
(1953).
225 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 440 (1872), Commissioners' Note. See Lorraine v. Long, 6
Cal. 453 (1856).
226 10 Fed. Cas. 1144 (No. 5765) (C.C.D.R.I. 1828).
227 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 440 (1872).
2 2 8 It echoes a similar exception for negotiable paper in CAL. CODE Civ. Paoc. § 368,
relating to assignment of choses in action.
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form. Eleven days after the enactment of the Code, a "revision commis-
sion" was authorized by the legislature.229 To this commission, Governor
Booth appointed Stephen J. Field, then a Justice of the United States
Supreme Court, Jackson Temple, a former Justice of the California Su-
preme Court, and John Dwinelle, a leading member of the San Francisco
bar.280 Working with the Code Commissioners, who were continued in
office,28 1 this Commission to Examine the Codes functioned from June
to October 1873.1 The Commission sought to focus California lgal
thinking upon improving the Codes, soliciting suggestions from leading
citizens; 283 it prepared five draft acts of amendments, which it published
with annotations in October 1873.11 The draft acts were the basis for
extensive amendments to the Codes at the next session of the legislature.23 5
One of the amendments wrought Code of Civil Procedure section 440
into its present form:
229Parma, supra note 209, at 18.
230 Jackson Temple had been a justice of the California Supreme Court from 1870 to
1872; after his term expired, he went into practice with Governor Henry Haight, who left
the governorship at the same time Temple left the court. HisToRY OF THE BENcCH AND BAR OF
CAnroRNurA 660-61 (Shuck ed. 1901). Dwinelle, whose biography is sketched in id. at 465-
66, was apparently nominated to the Commission to Examine the Codes as a second choice.
A letter from Henry Haight to Jackson Temple dated June 1873 (in the Bancroft Library,
University of California, Berkeley) says that "Gov. Booth has selected you with Judge Field
and Sawyer to prepare amendments to the Code." Sawyer could be either E.O. Sawyer, listed
on the letterhead as Haight's law partner, or Lorenzo Sawyer, one of the group of lawyers
who corresponded with David Field about the 1872 codification. See note 209 supra.
231 C n- SSION TO ExuNE T= CODES, REPORT or Ocr. 11, 1873, at 4; Van Alstyne,
The California Civil Code, in WEST'S ANx. CAL. CIV. CODE 17 (1954).
232 The Commission, in its report of Oct. 11, 1873, at p.4, reports that it organized it-
self on June 21, 1873. Its draft acts to amend the codes, printed in a volume entitled
R ORT OF MESSRS. FIELD, TEmrLE, MW DWINELLE As ExA2mNRso THE CODES, SUB-
rTrED OCT. 13, 1873, all bear the date Oct. 13, 1873. See KIeps, The Revision and Codifica-
tion of California Law 1849-1953, 42 CAnTF. L. REv. 766, 777-78 (1954).2 33 A copy of the form letter soliciting suggestions is pasted in a scrapbook in the
Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley: Dwsuxw, SoMEx oF MY OwN SINS 152
(no date). The scrapbook covers the period 1859-73. That the Commission took oral testi-
mony is attested by its willingness to do so expressed in the letter, by its own report, and by
a letter from Charles R. Story to Stephen J. Field, July 6, 1887, in Rare Books Department,
Main Library, University of California, Berkeley, recalling the writer's testimony before
Justice Field. A number of the written suggestions were acknowledged, and even quoted,
in the annotations to the draft acts to amend the codes, contained in REPORT or MESsRS
FIE, TE11PLE, AND DWINELLE AS EXAINERS OF THE CODES, SUBMxrr Ocr. 13, 1873.
234 See notes 230-33 supra. These draft acts are, to the author's knowledge, collected
nowhere other than in the Report. The Report, in turn, apparently survives only in the San
Francisco Law Library, City Hall, San Francisco. Given the acknowledged usefulness of
the 1872 Code Commissioner's Notes, see, e.g., People v. Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d 798, 299 P.2d 850
(1956) (Commissioners' annotation to Cal. Pen. Code § 20 the basis of authoritative con-
struction), it is surprising that the exposition of the 1874 amendments in the Report has
not heretofore been unearthed and used.
2,35 The Amendments are collected in a volume separate from the other statutes, en-
titled Amendments to the Codes, 1873-74.
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When cross-demands have existed between persons under such cir-
cumstances that, if one had brought an action against the other, a
counterclaim could have been set up, the two demands shall be deemed
compensated, so far as they equal each other, and neither can be de-
prived of the benefit thereof by the assignment or death of the other 2 80
This change in wording was not annotated by the Commission as were
most of the proposed amendments; hence there is no sure clue to its
source. But it was introduced into the Assembly in 1874, was passed, and
was signed into law in March 18 7 4 ."s
The new wording of section 440 practically forecloses a reading which
restricts its operation to cases of death and assignment:s deeming de-
mands "compensated" becomes the significant language, and the words
about death and assignment are relegated to a position where they may
be only illustrative. Granted, the new section talks of deeming demands
compensated, and not of their automatic extinction. One could argue that
the change in word order is intended to signify no change in meaning, but
merely to correct the doubtful syntax of its predecessor section.
Two salient facts must be pointed out, however. First, John Dwinelle,
one of the Commissioners, was a man of great learning in history and the
law.23 9 That he knew of the civil law rule on compensatio may be assumed.
Dwinelle had in 1850 led a group of San Francisco lawyers in urging the
state legislature to adopt, "in its substantial elements, the system of
the Civil Law. 2 40 Second, in November 1873 the supreme court gave
its first interpretation of section 440 as it stood in Civil Practice Act
section 48 and in the 1872 Code. While this case, Hart v. Cooper,241 was
decided after the Commission to Examine the Codes finished its work,
it illustrates a reading of section 440 which prevailed among judges at
the time the Commissioners worked.
Hart sued on a note of Cooper's of which he was the assignee. Cooper
had made the note originally to Mead. Cooper pleaded that before notice
of the assignment, Mead had become indebted to him in the amount of
235 dollars, and he counterclaimed for that amount. At trial, Hart showed
that Cooper owed Mead 200 dollars, incurred at about the same time as
the 235 dollars owed Cooper. The supreme court might have adopted the
236 CAL. AmEDMNTS T T= CODES ch. 383, § 53 (1874). The bill to amend was A.B.
102 at the twentieth session of the legislature.
237 ASSEMBLY JoUmRAL, 20th Sess. 1089 (1874).
238 Compare text accompanying notes 212-13 supra.
2 3 9 This is indicated in the material collected in DWINELLE, oP. cit. supra note 233. See
also HISTORY OF TE BENcH Ai BAR OF CA I ORsuA 456-66 (Shuck ed. 1901).
240 SENATE JOURNAL, 1st Sess. 126 (1850); the letter was in support of a similar pro-
posal to the legislature by Governor Burnett. See Parma, supra note 209, at 10-11.
24147 Cal. 77 (1873).
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trial court's finding242 that the demands between Mead and Cooper were
mutual credits; on that basis, the court could find an implied agreement
that, at any given moment, only the balance of the account would be an
outstanding claim. Story could have been cited for that application of
the law to the facts found in the lower court.243 But the court rested on
section 440, paraphrasing its words: "The two demands [between Cooper
and Mead] were cross-demands, and must be deemed compensated so
far as they equalled each other.1244
The Commissioners to Examine the Codes may well have had a
similar view of section 440, which they sought to render in language more
apt. But there is no demonstrable connection between the case and their
deliberations, save one of time and point of view. This "point of view"
found expression in the California cases.
V
THE CALIFORNIA CASES
Between 1873 and 1946, section 440 was subjected to various con-
structions in a series of cases principally notable for not citing one an-
other; the "law" about section 440 was a series of rulings inexplicable as
reasoned efforts to develop a consistent policy toward a potent defendant's
weapon. In 1946, however, the supreme court decided the first of what
have become three leading cases construing the section. This 1946 case,
Jones v. Mortimer,45 and two which followed it,2 46 provide a framework
within which to view the prior and subsequent case law of section 440.
A. Jones v. Mortimer and its Progeny
The plaintiff in Jones was both shareholder and creditor of an insol-
vent savings and loan association. As holder of four shares he was in
1939 assessed four hundred dollars to pay the association's debts. In
1940, he obtained a judgment for $1536 for services rendered the associa-
tion in its solvent days. The defendant Building and Loan Commissioner,
successor-in-interest to the association, did not press the four hundred
dollar claim in the plaintiff's action, but four years later successfully
moved to block execution on the plaintiff's judgment. The plaintiff argued
that the statute of limitation barred the Commissioner's claim. The court
rejected this argument in an extensive analysis of section 440.
242 Transcript on Appeal, pp. 12-14, Hart v. Cooper, 47 Cal. 77 (1873); neither briefs,
nor trial transcript, cite § 440. It was either first mentioned on argument or applied by the
court of its own accord.
243 STORY § 1435.
24447 Cal. 77, 79 (1873).
245 28 Cal. 2d 627, 170 P.2d 893 (1946).
240 Sunrise Produce Co. v. Malovich, 101 Cal. App. 2d 520, 225 P.2d 973 (1950);
Haugef v. Gates, 42 Cal. 2d 752, 269 P.2d 609 (1954).
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The cross demands here, in the language of section 440, "have existed
between persons"--plaintiff and defendant. They existed between them
at least at the time the assessment became due and the plaintiff's
action on his claim was pending. They have existed under circum-
stances where if either brought an action thereon the other could have
set up a counterclaim. . . The next step is that the demands are
compensated. That can mean nothing more or less than that each of
the claimants is paid to the extent that their claims are equal. To the
extent that they are paid, how can the statute of limitations run on
either of them? There is no outstanding claim on which the statute
may run.247
Taken at face value the court's language comes down squarely for
automatic extinction of all cross-demands which satisfy the counterclaim
requirement.248 Given the breadth of California's counterclaim, this covers
a wide ground.249 Further, the court's language treats this process of can-
cellation as occurring independently of the will of either party, with no
requisite of notice. Certainly that was the case in Jones v. Mortimer. The
automatic compensation having taken place, it was sufficient to point to
it years later; the court's only caveat was that defenses to the respective
demands must be heard.50 Consider as well the court's attitude that the
"fact" of automatic compensation relieved the Commissioner of the duties
customarily visited upon a defendant in framing his pleadings. Accept
that section 440 accomplished "payment" of the respective claims to the
extent they were equal; payment, traditionally an affirmative defense, is
247 28 Cal. 2d 627, 632, 170 P.2d 893, 897 (1946) (alternative holding) (emphasis in
original). The court distinguished Lyon v. Petty, 65 Cal. 324, 4 Pac. 103 (1884), which
had held that claims barred by the statute of limitation could not be asserted under § 440.
The court in Lyon rested its holding upon a provision of § 438 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure as it then stood, requiring that a counterclaim coexist with the plaintiff's claim at
the commencement of the action. That is, the statute of limitation could not have run when
the plaintiff filed his action. Moore v. Gould, 151 Cal. 723, 91 Pac. 616 (1907) cast doubt on
the holding in Lyon, and the legislature in 1927 did away with the requirement that a
counterclaim exist at the commencement of the action. Cal. Stats. ch. 813 (1927).
248 The language in Jones about the statute of limitation and § 440 is an alternative
holding. The court noted that the statute of limitation is tolled on a counterclaim when
the plaintiff files his action. Since the statute had not run on the Commissioner's claim when
Jones filed suit, and since Jones's execution proceeding could be considered "a continuation
of the plaintiff's action," the Commissioner's counterclaim might be sustained on that
ground as well. 28 Cal. 2d 627, 633-34, 170 P.2d 893, 897 (1946). Regarding an execution
proceeding as a continuation of the original action, in which counterclaims may be pre-
sented which ought to have been pleaded at trial or before, is an anomalous analysis indeed.
See, e.g., De Castro & Co. v. Liberty S.S. of Panama, S.A., 186 Cal. App. 2d 628, 9 Cal.
Rptr. 107 (1960).
249 A counterclaim need only "tend to diminish or defeat the plaintiff's recovery" and
"exist in favor of a defendant and against a plaintiff against whom a several judgment
might be had in the action." CAL. CoDE Civ. Paoc. § 438.
250 28 Cal. 2d 627, 632, 170 P.2d 893, 897 (1946).
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waived if not seasonably pleaded. 251 Not only did the Commissioner in
Jones not plead payment in his answer, but he waited until the entire
matter had gone to judgment and execution proceedings had begun before
presenting his claim.
The rule of Jones was applied in 1950 by a district court of appeal. In
Sunrise Produce Co. v. Malovich,252 plaintiff sued for goods sold and
delivered; defendant admitted the account, but counterclaimed for trailer
rentals of an agreed value exceeding plaintiff's claim. The defendant's
claim was, however, ostensibly barred by the statute of limitation. The
court, reversing a judgment for the plaintiff, declined to distinguish Jones
v. Mortimer and held the defendant's claim not barred. Plaintiff in Sunrise
also challenged defendant's claim that the trailer rentals had an agreed
value; being unliquidated, plaintiff argued, the defendant's claim was not
eligible for treatment under section 440. The plaintiff relied on dicta in an
early federal case; 253 applying California law, the federal court had found
it conceptually impossible that unliquidated sums could compensate liqui-
dated sums. 254 The court in Sunrise dismissed this dictum as "a little
difficult to understand,1255 and said that section 440 applies to all cross-
demands which satisfy the counterclaim requirement.
The Sunrise view of liquidated claims was sustained in Hauger v.
Gates.256 Decided by the supreme court in 1954, Hauger is the third case
of major significance in the contemporary construction of section 440.
Defendant sold plaintiff a ranch, the contract of sale providing that
plaintiff be given certain ranch equipment by defendant. Defendant took
a note secured by a second deed of trust as part of the consideration.
Plaintiff failed to make payments on the note, claiming he need not pay
until the ranch equipment was either delivered or its value received in
withheld payments. The trustee recorded notice of breach; a third party
with notice of plaintiff's claim bought at the sale. Seventy days later,
plaintiff sued to set aside the sale. The supreme court held, taking plain-
tiff's allegations as true, that
plaintiffs were not in default at the time of the sale. Section 440
251 E.g., Pastene v. Pardini, 135 Cal. 431, 67 Pac. 681 (1902).
252 101 Cal. App. 2d 520, 225 P.2d 975 (1950).
253 Iowa & Cal. Land Co. v. Temescal Water Co., 95 Fed. 320 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1899).
254Id. at 321: "The compensation for which the section provides takes place just as
soon as the cross-demands coexist; the greater demand being credited with the smaller
and the latter entirely discharged. Each of the demands therefore must be of such a
character that they can be mutually applied in the manner indicated. If one of them is for
unliquidated damages (that is, for an uncertain amount), it is manifestly impossible for
the application to take place."
255 101 Cal. App. 2d 520, 525, 225 P.2d 973, 975 (1950).
25642 Cal. 2d 752, 269 P.2d 609 (1954).
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is explicit in stating that coexisting cross-demands shall be "com-
pensated so far as they equal each other," which necessarily means that
each of the claimants is paid to the extent that their claims may be
balanced in amount.2 57
This, the court concluded, though the claim for damages for breach was
unliquidated; for, as the court pointed out, "section 440 does not require
that the demands be liquidated."M58
Jones, Sunrise, and Hauger make section 440's breadth indisputable:
all cross-demands which satisfy the counterclaim requirement are auto-
matically extinguished to the extent they are equal at the moment they
first coexist. Before attempting a critique in part VI of his Comment, it
remains to discuss the scope and consequences of this interpretation, and
to point out some court-made limitations upon its operation.
B. Scope and Consequences of Automatic Compensation
Other than the questions considered in Jones, Sunrise, and Hauger,
namely the statute of limitation and the liquidity of the claims, problems
raised by section 440 include the running of interest on compensated
demands and mutuality.
2 5 7Id. at 755, 269 P.2d at 610-11. California cases prior to 1927 would not have
allowed Hauger to use § 440 to compensate his payments on the secured note. McKean v.
German-American Savings Bank, 118 Cal. 334, 50 Pac. 656 (1897), held that a bank could
not invoke § 440 to justify applying a customer's account to past due notes secured by
mortgage. The court said that § 726 of the Code of Civil Procedure prescribed the "one
form of action" for recovery of a secured debt; hence, such a debt could not be set up as a
counterclaim and compensation was unavailable. McKean was extended in Moore v. Gould,
151 Cal. 723, 91 Pac. 616 (1907). Moore sued to foreclose a mortgage; Gould set up simple
contract debts ostensibly barred by the statute of limitation, arguing that they had com-
pensated the mortgage debt and could be treated as partial payments of it. (The parallel
to the facts of Hauger is evident.) The court held Gould's contract claims were not partial
payments, for a mortgage debt could not be set up in a suit on an unsecured debt, citing
McKean, and the rights under § 440 are "necessarily mutual." The "mutuality" referred
to is mutuality of remedy. See text accompanying notes 263-69 infra. But cf. McCabe v.
Grey, 20 Cal. 509 (1862), allowing a mortgagor to assert as a counterclaim in a foreclosure
action judgments assigned to him. § 440 was not mentioned. Cf. Williams v. Pratt, 10 Cal.
App. 625, 103 Pac. 151 (1909), in which the $180 due a Mrs. Raymond was allowed into
compensation against an obligation owing on a security device in form of a deed in fee to
the creditor, he giving back a contract of sale conditional upon payment of the amount
owed. But the court said the device was not a mortgage.
In 1927 the legislature barred future excursions into the dialectical morass which is
mutuality of remedy; it amended Code of Civil Procedure § 438: "ET]he right to main-
tain a counterclaim shall not be affected by the fact that either the plaintiff's or the
defendant's claim is secured by mortgage or otherwise, nor by the fact that the action is
brought, or the counterclaim maintained, for the foreclosure of such security." Cal. Stats.
ch. 813 (1927).
25842 Cal. 2d 752, 755, 269 P.2d 609, 611 (1954), citing Sunrise Produce Co. v. Malo-
vich, 101 Cal. App. 2d 520, 225 P.2d 973 (1950).
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1. Interest
Interest does not run on a paid claim. If A owes B one hundred dollars
at six per cent per year, and B owes A one hundred dollars at no interest,
the claims are compensated. Should B think he is accruing interest, he is
mistaken. This rather straightforward deduction from the construction
of section 440 announced in Jones, Sunrise and Hauger was articulated
by a district court of appeal in Pan Pacific Sash and Door Co. v. Green-
dale Park, Inc.260 Although contrary authority exists,26° Pan Pacific
reached the only result logically consistent with automatic extinction of
cross-demands. 201
The consequences of this cessation of interest bear pointing out. A
owes B 1000 dollars at six per cent, the interest beginning to run on
January 1. B negligently runs over A with his automobile on January 1,
doing damage which a court later finds is worth 1000 dollars. Since A's
and B's claims coexisted on January 1, and since they satisfy the counter-
claim requirement, the adjudication of A's negligence claim amounts to
a retrospective declaration that A was not B's debtor as of January 1.
This has the effect of allowing A interest on his tort judgment from the
date of the tort, since in a state without compensatio, A would get a
judgment for 1000 dollars 62 and B would get a countervailing judgment
for 1000 dollars plus six per cent interest from January 1. The court in
such a case would set off the respective amounts as of the time of the
judgment.
2. Mutuality
Mutuality is an omnibus term: It may denote mutuality of remedy,
mutuality of obligation, or any of several other reciprocal states of being.
In the law of compensatio, mutuality means only that, in order for com-
pensation to take place, the demands must be due between the same
parties and in the same capacity.26 3 This rule, first articulated by French
and Roman jurists, 4 means, for example, that X cannot set off a personal
debt against one due to himself and Y as partners. Other examples com-
monly used by civil law writers include a father setting off debts due his
259 166 Cal. App. 2d 652, 333 P.2d 802 (1958).
2 6 0 Pavlovich v. Neidhardt, 128 Cal. App. 2d 559, 275 P.2d 836 (1954), appears to be
an egregious misconception of the nature of automatic compensation. Applying the rule in
Pan Pacific to the facts in Pavlovich, the defendant would receive $5600 more than the
court in Pavlovich held him entitled to. At the least, the disparity illustrates that inatten-
tion to the time of accrual and extinction of the demands has serious financial results.
261 This is the result in civil law countries which have adopted automatic compensa-
tion. See text accompanying notes 46, 141, 149 supra. See note 179 supra.
262 Interest would run only from the date of judgment.
263 "'Mutuality of remedy" is treated in note 257 supra.
264 See text accompanying note 148 supra.
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son, a husband setting off debts due the wife, and a tutor setting off debts
due his pupil. In none of these cases was the required mutuality present;
hence, compensatio could not take place.2 5
The most vexatious questions of mutuality arise today in decedent's
estate litigation. An easy case involves one who is both debtor and creditor
of the estate on claims arising during its administration. For example,
a debt owed by an executrix to the estate in the course of administration
is compensated against that due her for administering the estate.20 But
where one debt was incurred by the decedent during his lifetime and the
other is owed to the estate, having arisen during administration,2 7 matters
become more difficult. In one sense, mutuality is lacking: the decedent and
his estate are not the same "person.1 268 Yet to deny compensation in such
cases does little more than promote circuity of actions and multiple pay-
ments, and the few California courts which have considered this point
have relaxed the requirement of mutuality for this very reason.20
C. Limitations Upon the Operation of Section 440
Section 440 is not unrestrained in its operation; California courts
have, in a few cases, refused to permit compensatio in the interest of some
other policy or principle of law. The most important of these limitations
upon section 440 are contract provisions against its use, the policy in
favor of negotiability, the privileged character of particular demands,
waiver, and estoppel.
1. Consensual Limitation of the Right to Compensate
A 1950 district court of appeal case2 70 held that a bank's right to
compensate had been impliedly surrendered in a contract providing that
money in a certain account was to be used to indemnify the bank against
losses on paper discounted to it. This specification of a particular use and
"the practice of the bank in handling the account" 7' 1 impliedly forbade
205 Pothier §§ 630, 632.
266 Estate of Smith, 123 Cal. App. 2d 844, 268 P.2d 53 (1954).
267 The situation could be just the reverse and the problem would be the same.
2 68 See People v. California Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 168 Cal. 241, 141 Pac. 1181
(1914), discussing mutuality in exhaustive and wearisome detail.
269 People v. California Safe Deposit & Trust Co., supra note 268; Ainsworth v. Bank of
California, 119 Cal. 470, 51 Pac. 952 (1897). Allowing compensation of claims against
decedents and their estates circumvents the statutory requirement that claims be presented
to the executor or administrator of the estate, Cal. Prob. Code §§ 700-10, and approved by
both the representative and the probate court, Cal. Prob. Code § 711. See text accompanying
notes 294-96 infra.
27OEngleman v. Bank of America, 98 Cal. App. 2d 327, 219 P.2d 868 (1950). Cf. Eisen-
drath v. Bank of America, 118 Cal. App. 2d 434, 258 P.2d 13 (1953), in which the court
construed a similar, but distinguishable, contractual arrangement to allow the bank to
compensate plaintiff's account against an indebtedness.
27198 Cal. App. 2d 327, 330, 219 P.2d 868, 870 (1950).
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compensation of the account against other debts due the bank. The court's
view that compensatio can be limited by an implied agreement applies a
fortiori to explicit consensual waiver.
2. Negotiable Paper
When Section 48 of the California Civil Practice Act of 1851272 was
re-enacted as Code of Civil Procedure Section 440, a new sentence was
added explicitly excluding from the section's operation certain cross-
demands existing in favor of the maker of a negotiable instrument.27 The
sentence, intended evidently to protect the negotiability of commercial
paper, was deleted in the 1873-74 revision of the codes 274 Without re-
ferring to this statutory history, the supreme court in 1915 held that
section 440 "was not intended to, and does not affect the negotiability
of commercial paper, or the rights of bona fide transferees of such
paper. 75 This rule is broader than the 1872 statutory exemption, for
it covers cross-demands against, as well as in favor of, the maker of nego-
tiable paper; the 1915 case involved a demand against the maker of a
bill. Further, the court's language applies not only to makers, but to
holders in due course as well.
3. Preferred Claims
Mechanics and former wives, inter alia, constitute groups whose
interests the law is assiduous to protect. Hence, California courts have
held that the obligation to pay alimony cannot be compensated against
debts due the husband from the wife,27 16 and that money due a general
contractor, but subject to claims of subcontracting materialmen, can-
not be compensated against contract damages due the owner from the
general contractor. 7 The husband must pay the alimony and maintain
his action for the debt. The owner must pay off the subcontractors and
rely on the solvency of the general contractor, plus any sum unpaid on
the contract in excess of payments to materialmen, to satisfy a damage
judgment for failure to complete the contract on schedule. Similar rules
might be developed with reference to other demands; for example, France
excludes from compensatio the wages of a workman.
278
272 Cal. Stats. ch. 5, § 48 (1851).
273 See text accompanying note 227 supra.
274 See text accompanying notes 229-37 supra.
275 Kunz v. California Trona Co., 169 Cal. 348, 146 Pac. 883 (1915).
276 Keck v. Keck, 219 Cal. 320, 26 P.2d 301 (1933). Cf. Murchison v. Murchison, 219
Cal. App. 2d 673, 33 Cal. Rptr. 285 (1963), in which compensation of a claim against
the wife arising after the divorce was allowed against payments due her. Keck was dis-
tinguished on the ground that Mrs. Murchison was not receiving alimony, the payments
to her being in the nature of a property settlement between the spouses.
277 Roberts v. Spires, 195 Cal. 267, 232 Pac. 710 (1925).
27 8Amos & WALToz, INTRODUCTiOx TO Fa xCn LAw 146 (2d ed. 1963).
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4. Waiver
Franck v. J. J. Sugarman-Rudolph279 was a suit for the purchase price
of a business which the plaintiff had sold to the defendant. Defendant
asserted that the business was worth far less than the plaintiff had guar-
anteed it to be worth, and pleaded an agreement that plaintiff would make
good any discrepancies between an audit of the business and plaintiff's
representations. The court held that the defendant had waived any claim
under the contract or section 440 by not responding to plaintiff's entreaties
over a four-year period to deliver a copy of the audit made by defendant's
accountants.
A theory similar to waiver was used in a 1922 district court of appeal
case, Reveal v. Stell.2 80 A distributee of the estate of one Grot sued on a
note made by the defendant to Grot. The defendant counterclaimed for
services rendered to Grot during the latter's lifetime. The court said that
the claimed compensation could not be recognized: the right to compen-
sate cross-demands "is subject to compliance with the law requiring the
presentation of such claim to the executor or administrator of the estate
against which the cross-demand existed."'281 A statutory claim period is,
however, not unlike a statute of limitation; Jones v. Mortimer held that
section 440 operated to discharge the mutual claims and hence that there
was nothing on which the statute could run. Perhaps, therefore, Jones
v. Mortimer impliedly overruled Reveal v. Stell. On the other hand, the
holding in Reveal might be placed upon the ground that, irrespective of
whether there is a "claim upon which the statute may run, 282 the orderly
administration of estates requires that all claims, compensated or not,
be presented within the nonclaim period. This contention is more fully
examined in the concluding section of this Comment.28 3
5. Estoppel
The supreme court applied a theory of estoppel to protect the rights
of a creditor who had sought to attach a bank deposit in Walters v. Bank
of America.284 Mrs. Walters served the writ on the bank in her action
against Republic Securities Corporation; Republic at the time of service
had a general deposit account of 8000 dollars. The bank debited the ac-
279 40 Cal. 2d 81, 251 P.2d 949 (1952).
280 56 Cal. App. 463, 205 Pac. 875 (1922). But cf. Loucks v. Luckel, 107 Cal. App. 2d
217, 236 P.2d 805 (1951), in which the court held that a defense of payment of a note
secured by a deed of trust was not barred for failure to present it to the creditor's executor,
citing § 440.2 81Supra note 280, at 466, 205 Pac. at 876.
282 Jones v. Mortimer, 28 Cal. 2d 627, 632, 170 P.2d 893, 897 (1946).
283 See text accompanying notes 294-96 infra.
284 9 Cal. 2d 46, 69 P.2d 839 (1937).
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count by this amount, applying the proceeds to a secured note of Republic's
which it held, and returned the writ marked "defendant indebted to the
bank."2 86 Later, the bank debited the note, recredited the account, and
allowed Republic to draw checks on it. Mrs. Walters had judgment
against Republic and could not collect it; she then sued the bank, claiming
to have validly attached the deposit. The court held the bank's conduct
"indisputably" inconsistent with its denial that it possessed attachable
funds.2 86 The result seems fair, but difficult to square with section 440
as interpreted by Jones, Sunrise, and Hauger. If the note from Republic
and Republic's deposit account were "cross-demands" within the meaning
of section 440, they were compensated from the moment they coexisted,
and there were no attachable funds in the bank's possession when Mrs.
Walters' writ was served. Section 440's operation is, after all, automatic.
Perhaps the result could be justified by noting that Mrs. Walters did
not know Republic was indebted to the bank; as an outsider, she knew
only of the deposit account. The bank was free at any time to compensate
the account against the note, but did not do so until Mrs. Walters had
first served her writ. Borrowing the civil law rule that compensation can
never be invoked to the prejudice of third persons,2 7 the bank is re-
strained from claiming the benefit of a compensation which it did not
recognize on its books until it was convenient for it to do so. But the
court in Walters neither borrowed the civil law rule, nor attempted to
integrate its result with any doctrinal generalities about section 440. This
omission to look beyond the facts of the case at bar to the result intended
to be achieved by section 440, and to section 440's place in the substantive
and adjective law of cross-demands, is characteristic of California's
judicial interpretations of compensatio. The concluding section of this
Comment attempts to articulate a rational policy toward section 440,
in light of its history and the California case law.
VI
TOWARD A RATIONAL VIEW OF compensatio
Admission and adjudication of cross-demands posed conceptual prob-
lems for the common law, obsessed with reducing the lawsuit to one issue
and deciding it on that basis.288 The inherent pettifoggery of the writ
system multiplied the difficulty. Mansfield, schooled alike in the common
285 Id. at 50, 69 P.2d at 840.
2801d. at 57, 69 P.2d at 844.
287 5 CONFERENCE DU CODE CiviL 131 (1805).
288 "The reduction of the controversy to some specific question is the object of all
pleading, and when reached, it is called the 'issue'; and the cause, when at issue, is ready
or trial or for decision of the issue raised." S mNx , Comm~oN LAW PL.ADno § 15, at 32
(3d ed. Ballantine ed. 1923).
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and civil law, could cast aside the ideology of common law pleading; Field
the reformer did the same.
But that did not of itself answer the practical problem of which cross-
demands should be adjudicated in the same action. Mansfield was content
to state the difficulty; Field made a small step toward meeting the prob-
lem. Today, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow free joinder of
counterclaims, subject to the trial court's discretion to order a separate
trial2 9 The difficulty in reconciling liberal joinder with automatic com-
pensation of cross-demands is suggested by just this provision of the
Federal Rules. A judge can oversee the operation of adjective rules about
cross-demands; moreover, because the whole controversy is outlined in
the pleadings, all parties have notice of the claims against them. In sharp
contrast, compensatio operates automatically and without notice. If
plaintiff's claim has been paid by the operation of section 440, the judge,
even if he thinks proof of the cross-demand will obstruct the trial, has no
power to exclude consideration of it. Section 440 is, as one court remarked,
"'found in a code of procedure, but it confers substantive rights. ' 200
This should influence consideration of section 440. Competing with
the policy of allowing free joinder of claims are policies which inhere in
the substantive law of contracts: chiefly, the principle that men should be
able to plan and order their jural relations with others, and to rely upon
their plans until notified to the contrary.
Our economic system rests upon a complex network of credit trans-
actions. Further, obligations are freely bought and sold; one cannot be
sure to whom he is indebted at any given moment. The image of the Bank
of America unilaterally adjusting its books to compensate all demands
against Safeway Stores suggests the difficulties posed by section 440. But
the 'difficulty does not, it is argued, rest with the idea of compensatio.
What is unthinkable is the suggestion that the Bank might not, in the
case assumed, give notice of its intention to compensate; what is unthink-
able is that two mutually indebted parties should not have control over
their reciprocal obligations.
In Hauger v. Gates,2 1 for example, the operation of compensatio
seems reasonable. Why should Hauger have to sue for his ranch equip-
ment? Gates was not misled by the refusal to pay; he had notice of
Hauger's claim and of Hauger's intention to enforce that claim by with-
holding payment on the note. Compensatio, it is suggested, is a beneficial
and workable principle of law; the solution to the difficulties it poses may
289 FED. R. Civ. P. 13.
290 Iowa & Cal. Land Co. v. Temescal Water Co., 95 Fed. 320, 321 (C.C.S.D. Cal.
1899).
29142 Cal. 2d 752, 269 P.2d 609 (1954). See text accompanying notes 256-58 supra.
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be found in a more rational view of compensatio, as yet not articulated
by California courts. We turn, then, to discussion of an appropriate gen-
eral theory of compensatio, followed by consideration of appropriate limi-
tations upon its operation.
A. A General Theory
The analysis of section 440 suggested here is best seen in the context
of a concrete problem: the running of the statute of limitation on one of
the claims. Suppose, for example, that A is indebted to B for one hundred
dollars, and A has an outstanding tort claim against B on which the statute
of limitation is one year, should A's tort claim be pleadable two years
hence when B sues on the debt?
Or, A is indebted to B in the sum of one hundred dollars, and B has a
similar claim against A. B dies. The period for filing claims in B's estate
passes, and A does not file his claim. B's executor sues A for the debt owed
B. Should A be able to plead compensatio?
Jones v. Mortimer 92 and Sunrise Produce Co. v. Malovic 293 are
authority for the proposition that A, in both of these cases should be able
to avoid the statute of limitation or statutory claim period. Here it is
argued, however, these cases are wrongly decided and that in neither of
the above hypothetical cases should A's claim be admitted. Rules barring
stale claims at times operate harshly, but they are essential to orderly
adjudication. Estates must close, controversies must be settled or for-
gotten so that people can get on with their work 94 In the first case
posited above, A knows he has a claim against B; if he really wants to
29228 Cal. 2d 627, 170 P.2d 893 (1946). See text accompanying notes 247-51 supra.
293 101 Cal. App. 2d 520, 225 P.2d 973 (1950). See text accompanying notes 252-55
supra.
294 Case of Broderick's Will, 21 Wall. 503, 519 (1874). The decedent was Senator
Broderick, Stephen Field's friend, who was killed in a duel by Chief Justice Terry of the
California Supreme Court. See Swisn., STEPmHr J. FrELD: CaRSAMA op Tm LAw 321-61
(1930).
The recent cases of Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956), and Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), cast doubt upon the traditional
view that there need be little notice to found an action in rem that will be safe from col-
lateral attack; the older cases have it that one is presumed to know if another attaches
or otherwise deals with his property, or that one should be aware that one's obligor has
died. But cases in which, for example, an executor knew of the decedent's obligation but
failed to notify the obligee, are in principle indistinguishable from the situation in Mullane,
which involved a trustee's obligation to give notice to beneficiaries of a fund comprised of
many small trusts. The Court said that each case rests on its own facts: whether the given
cestui has left a forwarding address, the amount of the fund and so forth. The minimum
due process required, however, is a letter to the cestui's last known address. Of course, if
an estate should be reopened on due process or equitable grounds, that is a different matter.
Here is argued only that the fortuitous existence of a cross-demand should not change the
decision whether to reopen.
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collect it, he will see a lawyer who will tell him about the statute of limi-
tation. The fortuitous fact of A's debt should not work a result different
from that which would obtain were A not B's debtor." 5 In the second
case, the refusal of courts to reopen probate decrees even where the claim-
ant did not see, and could not have seen, the statutory notice, testifies
to the strength of the policy in favor of settling estates quickly and
finally. 96
But conceptually, if compensatio be automatic and the demands paid
to the extent they are equal, how can the running of the statute of limi-
tation "unpay" them? The answer is that section 440's words do not re-
quire the view that "shall be deemed compensated" means the demands
are obliterated at the moment of their coexistence. "Shall be deemed
compensated" can be read to mean that the demands are provisionally
linked one with another at the moment they coexist. Their actual dis-
charge and extinction therefore, may require a further act: the statute
speaks not of "compensating" but of "deeming." The further act is the
assertion by one demandant of his demand, and either acquiescence by
the other in the compensation or a judicial declaration that the two
demands are compensated. Such an interpretation not only eliminates
a conceptual obstacle to applying the statute of limitation: it better
accords with the words of section 440. To say that the demands are paid
from the moment they coexist is to recast section 440 to read: "as soon
as cross-demands coexist ... they shall compensate, so far as they are
equal." On the other hand, to say that the demands are provisionally
linked when they coexist and that some further act is necessary to bring
about their extinction is to say as does section 440 that "when cross-
demands have existed . .. they shall be deemed compensated." The
"deeming" is a facultative or volitional act by one party or a judge,
declaring the demands annihilated. It is a declaration that nothing
which happened before or since the demands coexisted has operated to
bar the iight to compensatio. The "deeming" is a retrospective declaration
or adjudication of payment.
295 This is not to say that other facts than A's indebtedness may not operate to vary the
rule barring stale claims. For example, suppose A relied upon Jones v. Mortimer, 28 Cal.
2d 627, 170 P.2d 893 (1946), and Sunrise Produce Co. v. Malovich, 101 Cal. App. 2d 520,
.225 P.2d 973 (1950), discussed supra in text accompanying notes 247-55, and for that reason
did not assert his claim within the limitation period. A would have good ground to claim
compensatio, but the substance of his claim would be that the court should do equity to his
reliance-interest. A court could do this by prospectively overruling Sunrise and Jones.
296 E.g., Case of Broderick's Will, 21 Wall. 503 (1874). Granted this policy is ex-
pressed in fictions about in personam and in rem jurisdiction which, apotheosized in Pen-
noyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), have fallen into disrepute. It is not proposed to revitalize
tihese fictions, but to argue that the interest in winding up decedent's affairs is real and
substanial. See discussion in note 295 supra. But see Loucks v. Luckel, 107 Cal. App.
2d 217, 236 P.2d 805 (1951) and notes 280 and 294 supra.
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This view accords with Pan Pacific Sash & Door Co. v. Greendale
Park, Inc.,)2 7 which held that, from the time they coexist, interest does
not run on compensated demands; it also provides a consistent reference
point. If A and B are mutually indebted, and A invokes compensatio by
giving notice, but B refuses to accede, when does the compensatio take
place? When a judge allows A's defense of compensatio in an action
brought by B? When A first gives notice? Or at some other time? To
avoid extensive inquiries such as this, collateral to the litigation, it seems
most convenient to refer to the date when the demands first coexisted.
Usually that date is marked by some impressive event: for example,
A signed a note, or B was hit by a truck. The combination of automatic
extinction to stop the running of interest and volitional invocation of
compensatio is a feature of Scots and German law.298 In this view, the
act of A or B invoking compensatio, or a judge declaring it, only perfects
previously-existing rights.299
If, however, neither A nor B assert by appropriate out-of-court con-
duct their rights to compensatio, the running of the statute of limitation
should bar their right to assert their respective demands in a judicial
proceeding. The period of time set by the statute becomes, in this view,
a practical measure of when A is estopped from asserting, or has waived,
his claim against B. Of course, if A and B want to agree that A's claim
shall discharge A's unbarred debt to B, that is their affair; but it is not
a section 440 transaction.
This, then, is a suggested general theory of compensatio, consistent
with the language of section 440 and the orderly adjudication of cross-
demands. Given this framework, limitations upon section 440's operation,
based upon familiar public policies, may be articulated.
B. Limiting Section 440
There are three principal sources of policies to limit the operation
of section 440. To begin with, courts should consider policies which civil
297 166 Cal. App. 2d 652, 333 P.2d 802 (1958). But see note 260 supra and accompany-
ing text.
2 18 See notes 7-9 and 179 supra; BifatmLtcHE s GESETZBUCH § 388-96.
2 9DAdmittedly, this choice about the running of interest is somewhat arbitrary. The
rational arguments for it are that it prevents a lengthy debate about who gave notice to
whom and when; this debate is certain to occur if the date of notice-giving is made the
date when the cornpensatio becomes effective. Second, the date when the demands first
coexisted is in most cases relatively easy to find out. Third, the Scots, Germans and French
have no difficulty with the rule suggested in the text. The most significant argument,
though, is that cessation of the running of interest at the time when the demands first
coexist is consistent with the conceptual framework elaborated in part VI of this Comment;
if that framework be rational and expressive of the language and intent of § 440, then the
suggested provision for interest follows.
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law jurisdictions have found worthwhile, and adopt those which seem
relevant. Second, unlike civil law compensatio, section 440 compasses
unliquidated as well as liquidated cross-demands, and the breadth of its
provisions may dictate special policies. Third, the law of contract is a
source of relevant policy. The discussion can be organized under four
heads: estoppel, waiver, consensual restriction of the right to compensate,
and limitations arising from the nature of the demands.
1. Estoppel
Either of the claimants may be estopped to assert that compensatio
should take place. Let us take the hypothetical which opened this Com-
ment: A is struck by a department store delivery truck. He has a charge
account at the store, on which he currently owes five hundred dollars. He
decides to rely on compensatio to recompense himself for his injuries.
The store sends its monthly bill, and A neither pays nor explains his re-
fusal to pay. The store sends several reminders then assigns the claim for
collection. A should be estopped to assert compensatio against the bill
collector. His conduct led the store into thinking he would not pay, and
the store expended energy and money in acting on the basis of its reason-
able belief. The elements of an estoppel in pais are present.
2. Waiver
One who is entitled to compensatio may waive his right to it; under
the analysis presented here, automatic extinction of cross-demands is not
forced on a party against his will. Returning to the hypothetical concern-
ing the department store delivery truck, the injured person has a right
to compensate his claim for injury against his charge account bill.100 He
may, however, choose not to exercise his right; he may instead pay the
bill and seek to satisfy his tort claim in some other way. This would
amount to a waiver of the injured's right to compensatio. Many things
could lead him to do this: for example, his tort claim may be so specu-
lative that he does not want to jeopardize his credit rating by withholding
payment on his account, and this is the probable result if a claim of
compensatio later turns out to be invalid. The clearest analogy here is to
a case of fraud in the inducement to contract. The aggrieved party may
rescind, or he may stand on the contract and recoup his damages. If he
8 0 0 Right" is here used in a Hohfeldian sense. To the extent, however, that compen-
satio is volitional, to be invoked by unilateral declaration of either of two mutual debtors,
it would be more accurate to say that both debtors have a "power" to compensate. Under
the analysis of § 440 presented here, however, the automatic features of compensatio pre-
dominate; thus the statement that the injured in the hypothetical case has a "right" which
he waives, rather than a statement that he has a "power" which he does not invoke. See
Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology, 29 YALE L.J. 163, 167-69, 171-72 (1919).
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chooses to recoup by withholding payment, he must fairly estimate the
damage he has suffered: if his estimate is too high, and he withholds too
much, he is in default on so much of the contract price as exceeds the
amount he is entitled to recoup. 0 1 His liability-for forfeitures, default
penalties, and the like-is the same as in any other case of non-payment.
The prospect of these consequences-even under California law which
looks askance at forfeitures for default3°--may induce a potential claim-
ant to pay a liquid and exigible demand against him and sue for his un-
liquidated claim. This should be treated as any other case of waiver 0 3
3. Consensual Restriction of Compensatio
Engelhard v. Bank of America, °4 holding that a discount agreement
contained an implied term that the proceeds of notes collected were to
be applied to a particular purpose, articulates another reasonable limi-
tation upon compensatio. What may be done impliedly may also be done
expressly. This is not to advocate a constructional preference for finding
implied agreements not to compensate. But where it is clear, as in Engel-
hard, that the parties to a contract contemplate that their respective risks
of loss should be allocated in a particular way, one party should not be
able to upset the arrangement by pleading compensatio. The determina-
tion will necessarily depend upon the facts of each case.
4. Limitations Arising From the Nature of the Demands
The civil law excepted spendthrift legacies, deposited goods, and obli-
gations to the state from the operation of compensatio. In addition, French
law provides that a worker's wages cannot be the subject of compensa-
tio305 These determinations rested upon policies which the Romans, and
later the French, thought important. Similarly, policies relevant today
should limit the operation of section 440.
To begin with, the civil law rule that compensatio was not available
against deposited goods306 is reasonable and should be adopted by
California courts. This rule would, as respects deposits of specific chattels,
accord with the California Civil Code provision that, subject to a lien
for storage, the depositary must return the thing deposited.30 7 Bentham
30 1 Pavlovich v. Neidhardt, 128 Cal. App. 2d 559, 561-62, 275 P.2d 836, 838 (1954).
302 See, e.g., Freedman v. The Rector, 37 Cal. 2d 16, 216 P.2d 629 (1951); Ward v.
Union Bond & Trust Co., 243 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1957) (applying California law).
30 3 For a discussion of non-volitional waiver, see text accompanying note 279 supra.
304 98 Cal. App. 2d 327, 219 P.2d 868 (1950).
3 0 5 Amos & WALToN, INoDucTIoN To FRNcu LAW 146 (2d ed. 1963).
806 CODE 4.31.14; INsTurTES 4.6.30; Projet du Code Civil § 807 (1796); Code Civil
§ 1293 (1804).
307 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1822, 1856.
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cogently argued that the depositor may have some special attachment to
a chattel which renders its value particularly dear to him. He should not
be forced to liquidate his holding at its market value to transform it into
money-the universal equivalent-in order for compensatio to take
place.808
The California cases discussed in part V have also recognized the
special status of particular demands and refused to allow compensatio
against them. Compensatio may not interfere with the negotiability of
commercial paper.309 Funds subject to liens may not be compensated
away, leaving the lienor with a remedy beyond the property to which the
lien attaches.31 Alimony cannot be "paid" merely by asserting a cross-
demand and claiming compensatio.3 1 The policy underlying these deci-
sions is not only that men should be able to keep what they get in good
faith and for good money; the demandants comprise a class whose in-
terests the law is assiduous to protect, and their rights should not be
subject to the vagaries of fortuitously-existing cross-demands.
The civil law developed a further restriction upon compensatio which
applies specifically to banks: a bank may not take a general deposit,
such as a checking account, by compensatio and apply it to a note of the
depositor's.' If compensatio is automatic, this is perhaps a good rule;
if the law insisted that all reciprocal demands between, say, Safeway Stores
and the Bank of America were automatically compensated the moment
they coexisted, chaos would result. The parties would not be able to keep
up with the bookkeeping entailed by such a rule. The theory of com-
pensatio articulated above views compensatio differently. While under
section 440, the bank has a right to compensate demands against Safeway
in practice it seldom if ever does so. In the preceding discussion, this
has been termed a waiver of the bank's right. Taking this view, chaotic
consequences do not ensue because the situation is in control of the
parties concerned. An objection remains, however, to allowing the bank
to compensate. The bank can attach the deposit in connection with a
lawsuit,v 13 or it can, without reference to section 440, use its "banker's
lien" to credit a deposit to the depositor's indebtedness.314 With this array
308 BxrA, TE THEoRY oF LEGISLATION 146-48 (Ogden ed. 1931).
309 Kunz v. California Trona Co., 169 Cal. 348, 146 Pac. 883 (1915). See text accom-
panying notes 273-75 supra.
31 0 Roberts v. Spires, 195 Cal. 267, 232 Pac. 710 (1925). See text accompanying note
277 supra.
311 Keck v. Keck, 219 Cal. 320, 26 P.2d 301 (1933). See text accompanying note 276
supra.
81 2 See Comment, 8 Ti. L. REv. 423 (1934).
313 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 537-61.
314 CAL. Civ. CODE § 3054. See Gonsalves v. Bank of America, 16 Cal. 2d 169, 105 P.2d
118 (1940). The lien of § 3054 may extend only to securities and commercial paper deposited
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of remedies, why give the bank the additional one permitted by section
440? The only reply is, why not? As construed in this Comment, there
is no difference between the banker's lien and compensatio, and no net
legal effect by denying the bank a remedy under section 440.15 Both
means of taking a deposit should be subject to the limitations which
affect all applications of section 440. Some of these are outlined above,
but there are others. For example, a bank cannot assert its right to com-
pensate a deposit and thus defeat a tax lien upon the deposit. 16
Attachment raises a different set of problems. The California Code
of Civil Procedure outlines a number of exemptions from attachment and
execution;317 these provisions are designed to enable a defendant or
judgment debtor to continue to work and liveO18 They include certain
wages,3 19 a certain quantity of tools of one's trade,3 20 pensions,3 21 health
insurance benefits, 22 and so forth. When a bank is involved, these items
are relevant only when they have been converted into a deposit. But
since the California rule is that at least some exempt items may be traced,
giving exemption to the bank deposit into which they have been con-
verted,8 23 the discussion may be broadened to include other than banks.
by a customer of the bank. Money in a checking account, for example, becomes the property
of the bank, creating the relation of debtor and creditor between customer and bank.
Hence, the court in Gonsalves states that taking a customer's ordinary deposit was a non-
statutory matter governed by equitable principles of setoff. Section 440 was not mentioned.
815 This is not strictly true in all cases. Invocation by a bank of its right to compen-
satio is a declaration that the two demands in question were extinguished at the moment
they first coexisted, and that interest did not run on either from that time. The bank's use
of a setoff or banker's lien, on the other hand, is a mutual cancellation as of the time the
setoff is declared; interest ceases at that moment. Where the two demands draw interest at
different rates, this difference would be relevant; the difference may be nullified, though,
by contract provisions respecting treatment of the demands.
816 United States v. Bank of America, 229 F. Supp. 906 (S.D.Cal. 1964). In this case,
the bank asserted its right subsequent to the government's assertion of its tax lien. But
where the bank knows of the financial difficulties of a customer, and within four months of
his bankruptcy asserts its right to compensatio, that it would probably not be a "voidable
preference" under federal bankruptcy law. See Cusick v. Second Nat. Bank, 115 F.2d 150
(D.C. Cir. 1940); 52 Stat. 878 (1938), 11 U.S.C. 108 (1958). Perhaps the difference lies in
the relative strengths of the policies in favor of tax liens and in favor of the claims of
creditors of the bankrupt. See text accompanying notes 163-66 supra.
817 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 690-90.27, 690.50-.51. Moreover, one can attach only in
certain kinds of cases. See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 537.
318 See, e.g., In re McManus' Estate, 87 Cal. 292, 25 Pac. 413 (1890). The liberal policy
of California's exemption statutes has been evidenced at least since the 1851 exemption
provisions were drafted by Stephen J. Field, who describes his purpose in S. FiEin, EARLY
DAYs 3N CAxr.ORNs'A 73-81, 85-89 (1880).
319 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 690.10-.11.
820 CAL. CODE CIv. PEOC. §§ 690.3, 690.4, 690.6, 690.7, 690.8, 690.13, 690.14.
821 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 690.22-.23.
822 CAL. CODE Cirv. PROC. § 690.20.
823E.g., Carter v. Carter, 55 Cal. App. 2d 13, 130 P.2d 186 (1940).
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California courts should look to the attachment and execution exemption
statutes for limitations upon section 440; rights which cannot be taken
by attachment should not, arguably, be taken by compensatio. An em-
ployer should not be able to withhold earned wages on the ground that
the employee is indebted to him; a health insurance scheme should not
be able to withhold benefits to compensate debts due it by the beneficiary.
To adopt the restrictions contained in the attachment and execution
exemption statutes may amount to "judicial legislation," but when
legislative policy is clearly expressed that certain claims are entitled to
special consideration a statute may well be used as a datum for reason-
ing by analogy; compensatio raises problems analogous to those inherent
in attachment. Due to the paucity of compensatio case law, such limita-
tions have never been considered; and, the sweeping language of Jones,
Sunrise, and Hauger portends that the policies of the attachment exemp-
tion sections would not be self-evident to California courts in litigation
under section 440.
CONCLUSION
The discussion comes to this: the experience of others demonstrates
the workability of compensatio and provides suggestions for limiting its
scope of operation. A few limitations derived from policies familiar to
California courts could be added. The objectives are a rational basis for
adjudicating cross-demands and rules sufficiently precise to enable at-
torneys to advise their clients intelligently. California courts should
eschew judgment ad hoc and begin to bring the section 440 case law into
a rational pattern. In doing this, it is well to return to compensatio's
origins and history in search of the reasons for its existence and the
means to its intelligent application.
Michael E. Tigart
t Assistance in translating canon law materials, Beaumanoir's Coutumes de Beauvaisis,
and certain German sources was given by faculty members and graduate students in Boalt
Hall and the Political Science Department of the University of California, Berkeley. Ex-
cept where noted, all other translations are by the author, who is of course responsible for
all errors in rendering the foreign law materials into English.
